Higher Seminar in Statecraft and Strategic Communication | Jacob Hjortsberg

Abstract: This article introduces opt-in authoritarianism as a governance model that challenges the assumption that authoritarian rule is inherently prone to corruption and failure. Using Singapore as the empirical case, it shows how authoritarianism can deliver high-quality governance by aligning the interests of elites, citizens, and foreign investors through sovereign wealth funds, housing policies, and integration into global markets. Rather than relying primarily on coercion, Singapore incentivizes participation in an authoritarian order that is stable, efficient, and internationally attractive. The model rests on what Thomas Sowell calls a “constrained vision” of politics—managing trade-offs rather than pursuing utopian ends—which prevents the excesses seen in unconstrained authoritarian regimes. Beyond Singapore, the concept of opt-in authoritarianism illuminates how states may selectively adopt global liberal norms in the economic sphere while rejecting them in the political sphere, suggesting an increasingly relevant alternative to liberal democracy in a multipolar world.