Higher Seminar in Statecraft and Strategic Communication | Ronan Mainprize

Abstract: This presentation provides a new typology through which to examine the aims and outcomes of strategic intelligence disclosures for American foreign policy. Drawing on a range of case studies from the Cold War, the War on Terror, and the contemporary era of great power competition, the article identifies three categories: (1) offensive, (2) defensive, and (3) evolved. This typology reveals new insights on why different administrations have publicly released intelligence as part of strategic communication campaigns to support military operations and diplomacy, and identifies the positive and negative results they have garnered from doing so. The presentation finds that, on the whole, offensive disclosures have often resulted in politicisation, the leak of sources and methods, and misguided policies. On the other hand, defensive disclosures have been more often based on accurate intelligence, albeit with exaggerated policy outcomes, while evolved disclosureshave had a lesser impact on US foreign policy, only achieving minor successes. Such findings can inform future policy debates on the public release of intelligence, not only in the US but in other allied states.