Industrial Organization

Course facts

Code:
PHD0506
Credits:
7.5
Study period:
2026-10-27 - 2027-01-18
Organization:
Department of Economics

Description

Course Director: Richard Friberg

Introduction

Industrial Organization (IO) is the name given to the study of imperfectly competitive markets. Tools from IO are at the heart of many central questions for both policy and academe: How can we measure market power? What determines productivity? How can mergers and acquisitions by tech platforms be evaluated? How can we deter cartels? What determines the entry and exit of firms?

The course introduces you to the main models and empirical tools used in IO today. The course blends theory and empirics in a way that characterizes modern IO. We cover the following topics:

  1. Product differentiation in oligopoly
  2. Measuring markups and estimation of demand
  3. Mergers and other links between ownership and product market competition
  4. Entry/exit
  5. Collusion
  6. Regulation
  7. Digital markets

IO economists are in high demand from econ departments and business schools, as well as from competition authorities, market regulators and from consultancies that assist in competition policy cases. It is also a very active field in academia - several recent winners of the John Bates Clark medal have done considerable parts of their work in IO (for instance Gentzkow, Finkelstein and Nakamura).

Resarch proposal

As a part of the course you will write a research proposal and present it at a workshop at the end of the course. This can be a research proposal but a survey of a topic would do equally fine. I am open about exactly what you write – the point is to get you practice writing and thinking about problems that interest you. Aim for 7-10 double spaced pages.

Registration

Students who wish to participate, but who are not registered as second-year or older PhD students (in Economics or Finance at the Stockholm School of Economics, or in Economics at Stockholm University or Uppsala University) are requested to make applications to the course administrator as soon as possible. Admission decisions are taken sequentially as applications are received.

Course Administrator: Kathrine.Abelson@hhs.se

Literature

Readings will largely consist of articles. To the extent that the lectures rely on books my page references and coverage will rely on Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) “Industrial Organization – Markets and Strategies” (Cambridge University Press, second edition) and Davis and Garcés (2010) “Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis” (Princeton University Press).

A couple of free resources may also be useful for future reference: Victor Aguirregabiria has an empirical IO-book which is work in progress and is free to download. A free resource with broad coverage of standard models is available here

Papers for discussion

Starting with session 3 there will be papers for discussion on the reading list. These are meant to be read before hand and we will discuss these in class. The point is to help you see a set of papers that represent different research topics in current IO and to reflect on what constitutes a good paper. You will also select one of these papers for which you will write a referee report, to be handed in at the latest at the lecture where the paper is discussed. See separate document for instructions and examples of referee reports.

1. Introduction. Product differentiation in oligopoly.

a) What is IO and some broad-brush evidence on intensity of competition

b) Oligopoly models – Cournot, Bertrand and Edgeworth cycles

c) Product differentiation

  • Representative agent models
  • Linear city

d) Algorithmic pricing

Readings:

  • Belleflamme and Peitz (2010), Ch 3, Ch 5
  • Brown, Z.Y., and A. MacKay (2023). Competition in Pricing Algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
  • De Loecker, J., J. Eeckhout and G. Unger (2020), The rise of market power and the macroeconomic implications, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • Noel, M.D., (2015), Do Edgeworth price cycles lead to higher or lower prices? International Journal of Industrial Organization.
  • Shapiro, C. (2018). Antitrust in a time of populism. International Journal of Industrial Organization.

2. Measuring markups and estimating demand functions

a) New Empirical Industrial Organization vs Structure Conduct Performance

b) Demand estimation in differentiated products markets.

Readings:

  • Berry S., (1994), Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation, RAND Journal of Economics.
  • Berry, S. and P. Haile, (2021), Foundations of demand analysis, Handbook of Industrial Organization
  • Davis and Garcis (2010), Ch 6.1, 6.2, Ch 9
  • Hastings, J.S., (2004), Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California, American Economic Review.

3. Mergers and other links between ownership and product market competition

a) Overview of mergers and merger simulation

b) Common ownership

c) Merger remedies

  • Asker, J. and V. Nocke (2021), Collusion, mergers and related antitrust issues, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol 4.
  • Backus, M, C. Conlon, and M. Sinkinson, (2021) Common ownership in America: 1980-2017, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
  • Cunningham, C., F. Ederer, and S. Ma, (2021). Killer acquisitions. Journal of Political Economy.
  • Davis and Garcis (2010), Ch 8
  • Döpper, H., MacKay, A., Miller, N. H., & Stiebale, J. (2025). Rising markups and the role of consumer preferences. Journal of Political Economy.
  • Friberg, R., & Romahn, A. (2015). Divestiture requirements as a tool for competition policy: A case from the Swedish beer market. International Journal of Industrial Organization.
  • Schmalz, M. (2021) Recent studies on common ownership, firm behavior, and market outcomes, The Antitrust Bulletin
  • Verboven F. and J. Björnerstedt. (2016), Does merger simulation work? A “Natural Experiment” in the Swedish analgesics market, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

For discussion:

  • McClure, J.. (2024), Markups and Costs under Capacity Constraints: the Welfare Effects of Hotel Mergers, manuscript, Purdue.
  • Ederer, F., R. Seibel, and T. Simcoe (2024), Digital (Killer?) Acquisitions, manuscript, Boston University

4. Entry/exit

a) Strategic behavior with respect to entry

b) Entry/exit – nonstrategic settings

Belleflamme and Peitz, ch 16

  • Bresnahan T. and P. Reiss, (1991), Entry and competition in concentrated markets, Journal of Political Economy.
  • De Loecker, J. and C. Syverson, (2021), An industrial organization perspective on productivity, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol 4
  • Dunne, T., M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson, (1988), Patterns of firm entry and exit in U.S. Manufacturing, RAND Journal of Economics.
  • Foster L., J. Haltiwanger and C. Syverson. (2009), Reallocation, Firm Turnover and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability? American Economic Review.
  • Goolsbee, A., and C. Syverson (2008), How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • Klepper, S. (2002). Firm survival and the evolution of oligopoly. RAND journal of Economics.

For discussion:

  • Hidalgo, J. (2024) This Craft’s For You! Entry and Market(ing) Competition in the U.S. Beer Industry, KU Leuven
  • Hollenbeck et al. (2024) Retailer Price Competition and Assortment Differentiation: Evidence from Entry Lotteries

5. Collusion

  1. Tacit collusion
  2. Explicit collusion
  • Asker, J. and V. Nocke (2021), Collusion, mergers and related antitrust issues, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol 4.
  • Byrne, D. P., and N. De Roos, (2019), Learning to coordinate: A study in retail gasoline. American Economic Review.
  • Genesove, D., and W. P. Mullin, (2001), Rules, communication, and collusion: Narrative evidence from the Sugar Institute case. American Economic Review.
  • Hyytinen, A., F. Steen, and O. Toivanen, (2019), An anatomy of cartel contracts. Economic Journal.
  • Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P., & Tirole, J. (2003). The economics of tacit collusion.
  • Levenstein, M. C., and V.Y. Suslow (2006), What determines cartel success? Journal of Economic Literature.
  • Röller, L. H., and F. Steen, (2006), On the workings of a cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian cement industry, American Economic Review.

For discussion:

  • Kim, N and M. Weinberg (2025) Ohio Rock Salt Procurement Auctions, Bid Preferences, and Competition, manuscript Ohio
  • Musolff, L (2025) Algorithmic Pricing, Price Wars and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from E-Commerce, manuscript Wharton

6. The practice of IO: Analysis of electricity markets.

Guest lecture by Erik Lundin (IFN) and Thomas Tangerås (MDU)

  • Dennis Aigner, C.A.Knox Lovell, and Peter Schmidt, 1977. “Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models”, Journal of Econometrics, Volume 6, Issue 1
  • Bonev, Petyo, Matthieu Glachant, and Magnus Söderberg, 2022. “Implicit yardstick competition between heating monopolies in urban areas: Theory and evidence from Sweden”, Energy Economics, Volume 109.
  • Borenstein, Severin, and James Bushnell, 1999. “An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry.” Journal of Industrial Economics , Vol. 47, no. 3
  • Charnes, Abraham, W.W. Cooper, E. Rhodes, 1978. “Measuring the efficiency of decision making units”, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 2, Issue 6.
  • Lundin, Erik, 2021. “Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 485-536,
  • Wolak, Frank, A. 2003. "Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000." American Economic Review, 93 (2): 425-430.

7. Digital markets

  1. Two sided markets
  2. Demand estimation and visibility on platforms
  3. Price discrimination
  • Belleflamme and Peitz, ch 17, 22, 23
  • Calvano, E., and M. Polo (2021), Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets: A survey, Information Economics and Policy.
  • Corts, K. (1998), Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly: all-out competition and strategic commitment, RAND Journal of Economics.
  • Dinerstein, M., L. Einav, J. Levin, and N. Sundaresan (2018), Consumer price search and platform design in Internet commerce, American Economic Review.
  • Ellison, G., and S.F. Ellison (2009), Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the internet, Econometrica.
  • Enache, A, R. Friberg and M. Wiklander (2023). Demand for in-app purchases in mobile apps. International Journal of Industrial Organization.
  • Reimers, I. and J. Waldfogel, (2017), Throwing the books at them, Southern Economic Journal.
  • Rysman, M. (2009), The economics of two-sided markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives.
  • Shiller, B. and J. Waldfogel, (2011), Music for a song: an empirical look at uniform pricing and its alternatives, The Journal of Industrial Economics.

For discussion:

  • Püplichhuisen, P. and S. Sirries (2025), DMA in effect and (in)effective? Competition and Visibility in Online Product Search
  • Fu, H., W Dai and N. Foutz (2025), The Effect of Search Platforms on Retail Locations: Evidence from Yelp, Purdue.

Examination

There will be 7 meetings and one session with presentations of research proposals.

  • 40% of grade will be based on 2 problem sets (1 theoretical and 1 empirical that you will be able to solve with e.g. STATA or R).
  • 20% of grade will be based on class room discussion
  • 40% of grade will be based on a research proposal to be presented at the last session.

Schedule

Find the course schedule in: TimeEdit

Additional information

Have you been granted educational support because of a documented disability? If so, please contact the course director as soon as possible so that adequate accommodations can be made.

Contact specialneeds@hhs.se if you have questions about being granted educational support or need a copy of your educational support certificate.

For more information, visit the Specific Educational Needs page on the Student Hub (login required).