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Mini Course with Navin Kartik, Columbia University

Mini Course: An Introduction to Strategic Communication

In this 3-hours mini-course, open to all who are interested, Professor Navin Kartik will discuss a few classic and frontier game-theoretic models of information transmission and strategic communication. Coverage will include cheap talk, costly misrepresentation, and information design. The presentation will aim to provide a combination of formal arguments and intuitions.


  • Crawford and Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission”, Econometrica 50, 1431-1461.
  • Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007): “Credulity, Lies and Costly Talk”, Journal of Economic Theory 134, 93-116.
  • Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011): “Bayesian Persuasion”, American Economic Review 101, 2590-2615.
  • Frankel and Kartik (2017): "Muddled Information", mimeo (www.columbia.edu/~nk2339/).

Registration: By email to Ritva Kiviharju


Jörgen Weibull

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