Go to main navigation Navigation menu Skip navigation Home page Search

Mini Course with Navin Kartik, Columbia University

Mini Course: An Introduction to Strategic Communication

In this 3-hours mini-course, open to all who are interested, Professor Navin Kartik will discuss a few classic and frontier game-theoretic models of information transmission and strategic communication. Coverage will include cheap talk, costly misrepresentation, and information design. The presentation will aim to provide a combination of formal arguments and intuitions.

Readings:

  • Crawford and Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission”, Econometrica 50, 1431-1461.
  • Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007): “Credulity, Lies and Costly Talk”, Journal of Economic Theory 134, 93-116.
  • Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011): “Bayesian Persuasion”, American Economic Review 101, 2590-2615.
  • Frankel and Kartik (2017): "Muddled Information", mimeo (www.columbia.edu/~nk2339/).

Registration: By email to Ritva Kiviharju

Welcome!

Jörgen Weibull

This website uses cookies. By using this website you are agreeing to our use of cookies and to the terms and conditions listed in our data protection policy. Read more