While political debate often moves quickly from conflict to assumptions about large-scale displacement, survey data suggest a more nuanced picture. Sweden is a comparatively popular destination among Iranians, both in absolute numbers and relative to population size. According to a 2023 study in which Hammar participated, just over one million people in Iran would like to move to Sweden if the opportunity were available.

But who are they?

Those expressing a preference for Sweden tend, on average, to be relatively highly educated, often employed, less religious, and to hold values closer to prevailing norms in Sweden. 

Sweden is already home to more than 100,000 people with Iranian background: a group characterized by high levels of education and strong labor market participation. This long-standing diaspora helps explain Sweden’s appeal and suggests comparatively favorable conditions for integration should migration increase.

In his broader commentary on the issue, Hammar also emphasizes the importance of perspective: a potential refugee crisis is first and foremost a crisis for those forced to flee and secondly for neighboring countries that host large numbers of displaced people. Countries farther away, such as Sweden, are affected later and to a different extent. Border closures alone do not address the underlying drivers of displacement.

At the same time, he notes that it remains unclear what the war in Iran will mean for migration to Europe. 

If flows were to rise, the consequences would likely be both practical and political — across Sweden and the EU.

Listen to the segment (in Swedish):
https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/kommer-vi-att-se-en-ny-flyktingvag