SITE Seminar | Can sanctions deter illegal financial transactions?
Working paper title: "Can sanctions deter illegal financial transactions?"
By: Daniel Berkowitz, Guillermo Lezama and Laura Liu
Abstract
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) In the US Department of Treasury penalizes companies for doing business with foreign countries sanctioned by the US government. These civil penalties are generally unanticipated because they are announced only after OFAC has completed its investigation. We document that there were announcement effects for companies that were charged sufficiently large penalties. Moreover, the loss in market value almost always exceeded the size of large penalties suggesting that they could deter other firms from violating US government sanctions. We explore several explanations for why penalty size matters including shareholder morality, salience through the business press, Becker’s crime and punishment theory and managerial competence.
About the speaker
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