Identifying Collusion in English Auctions with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Welcome to Higher Seminar in Economics organised by the Department of Economics, SSE. The seminar speaker is Vadim Marmer, University of British Columbia, Vancouver School of Economics.
Vadim Marmer, UBC,VSE
"Identifying Collusion in English Auctions with Unobserved Heterogeneity"
ABSTRACT: We consider English auctions with asymmetric bidders and additive unobserved heterogeneity or common value components. We show that the bidders’ individual distributions as well as the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity or common value component are nonparametrically identified. Moreover, these objects are also nonparametrically identified when an unknown subset of bidders form an efficient cartel. The identification results can be used for detection of colluding bidders.
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