Mini Course with Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University and New York University
Education, Research, Seminar
2019-06-13 at 10:15
2019-06-13 at 17:00
Lecture room 750, Sveavagen 65
Mini course on Models of (Non-Bayesian) Persuation
The lectures will be based on the following 5 papers:
1. Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with Jacob Glazer, Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173.
2. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736.
3. A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with Jacob Glazer, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 395-410.
4. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent, with Jacob Glazer. Journal of Political Economy, 120 (2012), 1057-1082.
5. Complex Questionnaires, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 82 (2014), 1529-1541.
The lectures will take place on June 13, 10:15-11:45, 13:15-14:45 and 15:15-16:45, in room 750 at the Stockholm School of Economics.
All who are interested are welcome to participate in the course. For lunch there are a maximum of 25 participants. Please register (with name and email) for both the mini course and lunch here. Bookings for lunch closes June 7, at the latest, – please send specific dietary wishes to firstname.lastname@example.org.