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Brown Bag Seminar | Reputation on Networks

Welcome to Brown Bag Webinar in Economics organized by the Department of Economics, SSE. Seminar guest is David Jackson of Stockholm University. David presents a network model of reputation which investigates how a reputation system can regulate opportunism and facilitate trust in low frequency or one-off transactions beyond an agent’s immediate network. The setup focuses on how the network facilitates access to transaction opportunities and determines the distribution of reputational information.

David Jackson is a Ph.D candidate in Economics at Stockholm University. His primary research focuses on extending the theoretical understanding of  informal enforcement. In particular, how the patterns of economic interaction influence the nature of norms adopted by a community, the scope and severity of punishment and the prevalence and use of violence.

David will present a draft paper entitled "Reputation on Networks".

Abstract

This paper presents the basic setup of a network model of reputation. The model investigates how a reputation system can regulate opportunism and facilitate trust in low frequency or one-off transactions beyond an agent’s immediate network. The setup focuses on how the network facilitates access to transaction opportunities and determines the distribution of reputational information. When agents leverage trust over multiple homogeneously distributed transactions, the network structure determines a trust ranking of transactions between any two individuals. By incorporating how the salience of an agent’s reputation affects who gets informed, the model identifies additional gatekeepers who regulate the flow of information. These gatekeepers may receive limited trust but can facilitate trust between their links. The model views reputation as consisting of two parts. A collectively agreed upon norm and agents individual strategies given this norm. This provides a flexible framework that is tractable on a general network. Extending this framework by relaxing various assumptions, the model can investigate several interesting questions. In particular understanding the connection between local and generalised trust, patterns of informal sanctioning and the coordination on in-group out-group norms.

The link to the seminar will be distributed by invitation only. Please contact kristen.pendleton@hhs.se if you would like to attend the seminar.

Dept. of Economics Economics Lunch seminar Brown bag

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