SWEDISH HOUSE OF FINANCE



NOBEL SYMPOSIA

Nobel Symposium "Money and Banking"

https://www.houseoffinance.se/nobel-symposium

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Inside Money and Liquidity

Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore

Questions

Under what environment does liquidity creation arise?

When is the circulation of inside money essential for the smooth running of an economy?

How financial deepening interacts with economic development

Approach - Two forms of limited commitment:

Bilateral: Debtor may default to original creditor borrowing constraint

Multilateral: Debtor may default to new creditors limited resaleability

Framework

A homogeneous, perfectly storable good at each date

A continuum of agents (population size 3)

$$U_t = \ln c_t + \beta \ln c_{t+1} + \beta^2 \ln c_{t+2} + \dots$$

Production technology:


Invest at date t : $G(y) = \gamma y^{\frac{1}{1-\lambda}} \rightarrow y$: Harvest at date t+2 where $\lambda \in (0, 1)$: share of human capital

Agents are fully engaged during investing, growing, harvesting Can handle only one project at a time

Fixed supply of fiat money

The First Best Allocation in Steady State

$$y^* = G(y^*) + 3 \cdot c^*$$
$$G'(y^*) = \beta^2$$



Borrowing constraint: the agent can commit to repay only up to a fraction θ of output from the present investment

Resaleability constraint: each project comprises large number of parts, and a fraction α will fail. After investment, the original creditor privately learns which parts will fail, and the failing parts can be separated

 \rightarrow For a large enough $\alpha > \frac{1-\beta^3}{1+\beta^3}$, regular (blue) paper cannot be resold before maturity because of "lemons" problem

 $z \leq y$ fraction of projects can be bundled at additional cost $[(1-\phi)/\phi]G(z)$, where $0 < \phi < 1 \rightarrow$ special (red) paper backed by the bundled parts can be resold before maturity

Bundling \equiv "Banking" (Liquidity Creation)

 $q,n: {\rm price} \ {\rm and} \ {\rm quantity} \ {\rm of} \ {\rm newly} \ {\rm issued} \ {\rm illiquid} \ {\rm blue} \ {\rm paper}$

p,m : price and quantity of liquid red paper (inside money) that matures in the next period

Investing agent

$$G(y) + \frac{1 - \phi}{\phi} G(z) + c + pm + qn = p^2 \theta z + q \theta(y - z) + m'' + n'$$

Growing agent

$$c' + pm' + qn' = m + n''$$

Harvesting agent

$$c'' + pm'' + qn'' = (1 - \theta)y + m' + n$$

Goods market

$$y = c + c' + c'' + G(y) + \frac{1-\phi}{\phi}G(z)$$

Blue paper market

$$\theta(y-z) = n + n' + n''$$


Money market

$$p\theta z + \theta z \le m + m' + m''$$

where

equality holds and fiat money has no value if p < 1

fiat money may have value if p = 1



mortgageable output


Proposition 1 (Outside Money Only): If $\theta \in [0, \underline{\theta}]$, then there is no inside money and

$$1 = \frac{1}{p} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} < \frac{1}{\beta} < \frac{1}{\sqrt{G'(y)}}$$

borrowing constraints bind for investing agents

investment and output are lower than the first best

consumption is jagged: highest when harvesting and lowest when growing




Proposition 2 (Liquidity Creation): If $\theta \in (\underline{\theta}, \theta^*)$, then inside money circulates and

$$1 \leq rac{1}{p} < rac{1}{\sqrt{q}} < rac{1}{eta} < rac{1}{\sqrt{G'(y)}}$$

borrowing constraints bind for investing agents


investment and output are lower than the first best

consumption is jagged: highest when harvesting and lowest when investing



Liquidity Creation: Specialized Saving

Investing Agents		Growing Agents		gents	Harvesting Agents		
Illiquid Paper n"	Inside Money θz	Investment y		Inside Money <i>θz</i>		Money <i>m</i> "	Net Worth
Investment G(y)	Illiquid Paper $\theta(y-z)$		Illiquid Paper $\theta(y-z)$		Illiquid Paper <i>n</i> "		
	Net Worth			Net Worth			



Liquidity Creation: Overlapping Saving

Investing Agents			Growing Agents			Harvesting Agents		
Paper n" θz Illiqui Paper	Inside Money <i>θz</i>		Illiquid Paper n'	Inside Money <i>θz</i>	Money m" Illiquid Paper n', n"	•	Net Worth	
	Illiquid Paper $\theta(y-z)$		Investment y	Illiquid Paper $\theta(y-z)$		Paper		
Investment $G(y)$	Net Worth			Net Worth		π,π		

Proposition 3 (First Best Allocation): If $\theta \in [\theta^*, 1]$, then no money circulates and

$$\frac{1}{p} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q}} = \frac{1}{\beta} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{G'(y)}}$$

borrowing constraints do not bind for investing agents

investment and output are at the first best

consumption is smooth

