Market Efficiency in the Age of Machine Learning (discussed by A. Gargano, University of Houston)

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AI & Machine Learning in Finance, SSH

Summary of the Paper

• Research Question: How does information acquisition by machines affect market efficiency?

Relevant

- New technologies oftentimes produce nuanced effects
- * Efficient Market Hypothesis is (still) one of the most debated topics in finance
- Novel
 - * Many papers on the effect of information acquisition by humans, not much on machines
- Not obvious
 - * Positive, if machines can process a larger amount of info, faster, and in an unbiased fashion
 - Negative, if machines are unable to understand the context
- Stimulates thinking on the differences between humans and machines
 - * We are heading towards a world where humans will interact more with machines
- The paper has clearly already incorporated feedback from many conferences and seminar presentations
 - Extensive data work

Summary of the Paper

• Setup: EDGAR requests of 8-K forms by humans and machines

- Electronic system introduced in the '90 by the SEC to improve information dissemination
- ▶ 8-K filed when new material information → Semi-strong efficiency
- From I.P. address, 7 requester categories
 - * Cloud Computing Facilities, Institutional Investors, Media, Audit Firms, Internet Services, Data Vendor, Other
- 2 types of requesters: human and machine
 - Based on the volume of requests
- 7 × 2 total combinations
- Market Efficiency: Absolute Price drift in the 20 days after the release of information
 - Larger drift implies lower efficiency
 - Because information at time t is slowly incorporated over t + N

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Main Results

• Magnitude: Since 2015, requests from machines have exploded, humans remained constant

Determinants of Info Acquisition:

- Similarities: Higher attention to 8-K containing more info (longer and more items) and more timely
- Differences
 - * Humans: more attention to 8-K with negative news and from firms with high market cap and BM
 - * Humans: more attention to Item 2.02 (Earnings) while machine to item 8.01 (Other events)

Market Efficiency

- Humans decrease efficiency
 - * No heterogeneity: also true for CouldComputing and Institutional Investors
- Machines have no effect
 - * Heterogeneity: CouldComputing improves efficiency, Institutional Investors no effect

Endogeneity

- Exogenous Cloud Outages
- S&P 500 inclusion
- Channel: Sophisticated investors use CloudMachines to process information and trade
 - More informed trading (PIN) and More Algorithmic trading
 - Surrounding their requests
- Humans v.s. machines: Machines are better at processing
 - Numerical information
 - Negative news

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Comment 1: Information Acquisition and Disagreement

- The world disagreement never appears in the paper...
- However, public info can generate disagreement
 - Theory: Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995)
 - Intuition: Investors might interpret the same information differently
 - Formula: $p(\theta | data) \propto \mathcal{L}(\theta | data) p(\theta)$

posterior Likelihood / Model prior

- ★ Same posterior (Agreement) \leftarrow uninformed prior and same likelihood
- ★ Different posteriors (Disagreement) ← different (informed) prior and/or different Likelihood
- Extensive evidence that disagreement can exacerbate mispricing and delay its correction
 - Sadka and Scherbina (2007)
 - Gargano, Sotes-Paladino and Verwijmeren (2022)
 - And references therein
- Typically measured with
 - Abnormal Trading Volume around information events
 - Dispersion in Analysts' recommendation

Suggestions

- **(**) Include as a control in regressions of Price Drift \rightarrow higher disagreement makes drift worse
- 2 Do machines disagree more than humans? Not obvious to me
 - IF machines process filings in isolations, they might not have "a prior"
 - \star However, algorithms might generate more dispersion than human

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Comment 2: Price Drifts and Short Selling Constraints

- The absolute price drift measure employed does not distinguish between underreaction to
 - ► Good news → positive price drift
 - ► Bad news → negative price drift
- The presence of Short Sellers is relevant for both
- Positive Drift: Miller (1997) predicts that short-selling constraints
 - Prevent views from bearish investors to be incorporated
 - Measures: high shorting fees, high fee volatility, low supply
- Negative Drift: Higher short selling activity improves information efficiency (wrt to bad news)
 - Evidence in Bohemer and Wu (2013) based on the prediction of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)
 - Measures: short interest, short volume
 - Also important for the regressions interacting CloudComputing with Negative sentiment
 - * Paper argues that CloudComputing machines are less biased than humans in processing negative news
 - * This is also when short sellers might be more active
- Suggestion
 - Take these effects into account

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Comment 3: Tighten the Mechanism (further)

Who are sophisticated investors behind CloudComputing-Machines?

- Heterogeneity results beg the question
 - ★ CloudComputing-Machines: improve efficiency
 - CloudComputing-Humans: worsen efficiency
 - * Institutional Investors-Machine: no effect
 - Institutional Investors-Human: worsen efficiency
- The data does not allow you to observe Institutional Investors that use cloud computing
- Can you at least show that there are sophisticated investors fading out from EDGAR?

Image of Machine Learning" or "in the Age of Cloud Computing"?

- Investors might switch to cloud computing because
 - 1 Secrecy
 - 2 Cost-efficiency
 - 3 Use of Machine Learning / Big Data Analytics
- Both [1] and [2] could predict improvement in market efficiency because correlated with higher sophistication
- Can you show that those sophisticated investors who fade out from EDGAR also search for more Machine Learning related workers?
 - * E.g. Burning Glass, LinkUp data

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Comment 4: The importance of Speed...

- When it comes to info acquisition, it is not only about whether to acquire the info, but how fast
- Sophisticated Investors compete to access information as fast as possible
 - Trade milliseconds before the public release of macro news
 - * Bernile, Hu, Tang (2015) and Pang Wang and Zhu (2017)
 - Use the FOIA to acquire information before it gets publicized
 - Gargano, Rossi and Wermers (2015)
 - Form 4 (insider trade) filings are available to paying subscribers before posted to the EDGAR
 - * Rogers, Skinner and Zechman (2017)
- Given the timestamps of when the 8-K is released and acquired
 - You could plot the number of requests (y-axis) on $\Delta = \tau_{released} \tau_{acquired}$ (x-axis)
 - It is natural to expect that machines acquire information faster than humans
 - How much heterogeneity is there across machines?
 - Are drifts different when information is acquired faster?
- You restrict to the requests on days t and t + 1, what happens between t+2 and t+N?
 - Do humans keep submitting requests?
 - Do Cloud machines' requests drop after t + 1? This would be consistent with your proposed mechanism

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Comment 5:...And context

- Humans might have an advantage in that they are able to better contextualize the info
- Hou and Moskowitz (2005) develop an efficiency measure based on
- Delay with respect to price responds to market info
- Run $\mathbf{r}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \mathbf{r}_{m,t} + \sum_{n=1}^{N} \delta_{i,n} \mathbf{r}_{m,t-n} + \epsilon_{i,t}$
 - Restricted ($\delta = 0$)
 - Unrestricted
- And compute $D_i = 1 \frac{R_{[\delta_{i,n}=0,\forall n]}^2}{R^2}$
- Higher $D_i \rightarrow$ slower incorporation of market information \rightarrow higher inefficiency
- This measure might capture inefficiency wrt to market information
 - Machines might not improve this kind of efficiency if they look at 8-K in isolation

Minor Comments

- Restricting the sample to filings with the same filing and event date does definitely make sense. On the other hand it might
 - Undersample bad news (literature on withholding negative news)
 - Undersample some types of items (see Ben-Rephael et. al. 2022)
- Provide some info on the Supply of 8-K. Is the need of machines driven by an increase in supply?
- Also try Quarterly FE rather than Annual FE
- Results in Table 3 show that humans (machines) tend to pay more attention to Item 2.02 (Item 8) while results in Table 11 indicate that machines have an advantage in processing numerical information. Seems a bit of a contradiction.
- Many papers that use Edgar data. Do better justice to the literature
 - Gibbons, Iliev, Kalodimos (2021); Iliev Kalodimos and Lowry (2020); Crane, Crotty Umar (2019); Li and Sun (2018); Cao, Kilic and Wang (2020) and several others

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Conclusions

Very important, interesting, and carefully executed paper

2 Looking forward to seeing it in a top Journal!

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