Department of Economics
I currently do research primarily on the economics of conflict, including applications to such topics as international conflict and the origin of democracy, self-allocation by individuals to contests, and how contest structure affects total conflict effort. I teach game theory, political economy, and economics of conflict.
Selected recent publications
“Chaotic Dynamics in Contests.” Economic Inquiry 56, pp 1486--1491, 2018.
“The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation.” In R D Congleton, B N Grofman, and S Voigt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
The Economics of Conflict: Theory and Empirical Evidence, MIT Press, 2014.
“Common-Value Contests with Asymmetric Information.” Economics Letters 120, pp 525–527, 2013.
“Informational Aspects of Conflict.” In M Garfinkel and S Skaperdas (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, Oxford University Press, 2012.
“Multi-Player Contests with Asymmetric Information,” Economic Theory 51, pp 277–287, 2012.
“The Evolution of Preferences for Conflict,” Economics Letters 116, pp 102–104, 2012.
5 most cited articles (Web of Science)
“Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability,” Games and Economic Behavior 5, pp 532–546, 1993.
“Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization,” Journal of Public Economics 69, pp 435–450, 1998.
“Information in Conflicts,” Journal of Economic Theory 110, pp 121–136, 2003.
“Inside versus Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm” (with H M Müller), RAND Journal of Economics 32, pp 527–541, 2001.
“In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation,” Games and Economic Behavior 33, pp 145–158, 2000.