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Seminar in Economics | Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental evidence in Mexico’s Labor Courts with Christopher Woodruff, University of Oxford

We use a field experiment with ongoing cases to analyze sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labor court.

Welcome to the Higher Seminar in Economics organised by the Department of Economics, SSE. The seminar speaker is Christopher Woodruff, University of Oxford.

Chris Woodruff is Professor of Development Economics at the University of Oxford. His research focuses on private sector development.

Christopher will present “Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental evidence in Mexico’s Labor Courts” (joint with Joyce Sadka and Enrique Seira).

Abstract

Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use a field experiment with ongoing cases to analyze sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labor court. Providing the parties with personalized outcome predictions doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration, but only when the worker is present to receive the information. An intervention before plaintiffs contact a lawyer increases pre-suit settlement. The experiment illuminates agency issues among plaintiffs with private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.

This seminar takes place in person at Stockholm School of Economics, Sveavägen 65, in lecture hall Torsten

Please contact kristen.pendleton@hhs.se if you have questions.

Dept. of Economics Development Labor Economics Seminar Seminar in economics

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