Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information Flows in Government Bureaucracies: Experimental Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service
Department of Economics is welcoming you to the online job market seminar "Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information Flows in Government Bureaucracies: Experimental Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service" with Martin Mattsson, Yale University.
Start time:
2021-02-03 at 10:00
End time:
2021-02-03 at 11:15
Location:
Online via Zoom
Martin Mattsson is a PhD candidate at Yale University. Martin's research interests include Development Economics, Political Economy, and Public Economics.
Job market paper: Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information Flows in Government Bureaucracies: Experimental Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service
This is an online seminar which will take place via Zoom. The link to the seminar will be distrubted by invitation only. Please contact malin.skanelid@hhs.se if you would like to attend the seminar.