Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests, with Johan Lagerlöf
2020-06-10 at 15:30
End time: 2020-06-10 at 16:45
Location: Online seminar
Welcome to Higher Seminar in Economics organised by the Department of Economics, SSE. The seminar speaker is Johan Lagerlöf, University of Copenhagen. Johan's research interests are in the field of political economy, industrial organization, microeconomics, and applications of game theory and contract theory.
Abstract: In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win.
This is an online seminar which will take place via Zoom. The link to the seminar will be distrubted by invitation only. Please contact firstname.lastname@example.org if you would like to attend the seminar.