The Financialization of Oil Markets: Potential Impacts and Evidence

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1. Background

- Sharp oil price cycle during 2002-2008 cycle and more recently oil price rises in 2012 and 2013 polarised debate about drivers of oil prices
  - Fundamentals
  - Expectations about these fundamentals
  - Financialization of oil markets
  - Speculation
  - Market manipulation

- All of the last three are often treated as one group

- Massive expansion in the financial layers of oil: more funds, higher trading volumes, more instruments, increasing sophistication of financial instruments
Rapid Growth in Open Interest on Crude Oil Futures Exchanges

Average Daily Open Interest in Crude Oil Futures in US Exchange
(number of contracts, thousands)

Source: EIA
Money Managers Net Long in U.S. Oil Futures Market

US Exchange Traded Futures Positions by Money Managers

Money managers tend to be net long in the U.S. oil futures market.

Source: EIA
Crude oil plays a major role in commodity investment

2013 Target Weights of the Dow Jones - UBS Commodity Index

- Gold: 11%
- Crude Oil: Brent: 6%
- Natural Gas: 10%
- Heating Oil: 4%
- Gasoline: 3%
- Corn: 7%
- Soybeans: 7%
- Soybean Oil: 3%
- Sugar: 4%
- Wheat: 5%
- Lean Hogs: 2%
- Live Cattle: 3%
- Live Hogs: 2%
- Silver: 4%
- Nickel: 2%
- Aluminum: 5%
- Copper: 7%
- Zinc: 3%
- Nickel: 2%
Context and Research Question

• Do the changes in the financial layers of the oil market impact price behaviour? And how?

• Does financialization represent "a welcome improvement in market efficiency" or "a worrisome development"?

• Does financialization improve or reduce consumer welfare?

• Our answer:
  – Financialization has little effect on key oil market variables and final consumers’ welfare
  – From a regulatory point of view crucial to identify channels through which financialization can result in market failure and design policies accordingly
2. Financialization in Oil Markets

• Captures increasing exposure to commodities by a wide set of financial players with no physical interest such as hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies and retail investors

• Exposure through variety of financial instruments: futures, options, exchange traded funds, index funds, and bespoke products
  – Financial innovation provided an easy and a cheap way for various participants to gain exposure to commodities

• Motives of entry
  – Return enhancement
  – Commodities performance counter-cyclical with stocks and bonds and hence diversification benefits
  – Inflation hedge
  – Hedge against a weak dollar
Financial Players Not Homogenous

- **Investment banks / Swap dealers**
  - Largest traders of oil since collapse of OPEC administered pricing system in 1986
  - More involved in bridging gaps between producers and a more diverse set of customers

- **Hedge funds**
  - Macro hedge funds
    - Trade in a range of markets (not just commodities)
    - Have a top-down approach and take a view on macroeconomic issues
  - Specialist commodity hedge funds
    - Bottom-up approach, use large quantities of data; take a strong view of fundamentals of supply and demand
  - ‘Black box’ hedge funds
    - Have a view of the oil price based on calculations known only to themselves

- **Institutional investors** primarily consist of pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds
  - Typically put a small share of their funds into commodities for sake of portfolio diversification
  - Tend to sell when prices are high and buy when they are low, stabilising the market, owing to limits in their portfolios

- **Retail investors**, including private investors and high net worth individuals
  - one of the fastest growing categories
3. The Potential Impacts on Oil Markets

- Several arguments
  - Increases the spot price
  - Increases oil price volatility and more uncertainty in oil prices
  - Leads to higher oil price co-movement with financial assets and other energy and non-energy commodities (shocks from financial layers transmitted to commodities)
  - Affects crude oil futures returns and risk premia
  - Break inventory-oil price relationship
  - worse outcome for final consumers . . .
  - leave consumers more exposed to vagaries about supply and demand prospects.

- Is the empirical evidence supportive of these effects?

- Several empirical approaches (most of the literature is empirical)
  - Dynamic Correlation Analysis
  - Granger Causality
  - VAR approach
  - Calibrated macro finance Structural models
3.1 Some ‘Crude’ Facts

Figure 1: Price of Non-Exchange Traded Commodities and Price of Crude Oil

Source: IEA Oil Market Report, March 15, 2011
Exchange VS Non-Exchange Traded Commodities

Average wholesale price of onions at Chicago (USD/Cwt)

Orion futures trading banned, August 1968

Source: Deutsche Bank, Commodity Weekly, 14 August 2009, Figure 1.

Source: Deutsche Bank, Commodity Weekly, 14 August 2009, Figure 2.
Investment Inflows into Commodities and Prices

Investment inflows to commodities, (Indices, ETP, MTNs, $bn) and Commodity Price Indices

Source: Barclays Capital, IMF
Price Volatility

Price Volatility in Crude Oil and Non-Exchange-Traded Commodities

Source: IEA Oil Market Report, March 15, 2011
3.2 Correlation Analysis

- Increased price co-movements between equity and oil returns

- Increased correlation between exchange rates and oil prices

- Increased price co-movements between energy and non-energy commodities’ returns

- Correlation between index investment commodities is higher than those for commodities outside index
Drawbacks

• Correlation not stable over time
• Structural break in correlation depends on frequency used (1 week, 1-day, 1-hour, 5-minute, 10-second, and 1-second frequencies)
• Evidence not fully supportive (Stoll and Whaley, 2010)
  – Price of index commodities don’t necessarily move together (Oil and Gas or energy and food)
• Not clear which players are driving these correlations
  – Hedge funds investing in many markets (Büyükşahin and Robe, 2011)
  – High frequency trading activities and algorithm strategies (Bichetti and Maystre, 2012)
  – Index investors (Masters, 2008)
  – Institutional investors (Basak and Pavlova, 2013)
• Common real macroeconomic shocks driving correlation (can’t infer causation)
  – News about global demand drives traders’ positions
  – News about global demand drives oil prices
  – i.e. correlation driven by one fundamental factor
• Why does all this matter? Any welfare consequences?
  – Markets have become less segmented and more interconnected. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
Correlation Highly Unstable

Source: EIA
Why all this Matters?

• Büyükşahin and Robe (2011):
  • “additional work is needed, if one is to ascertain whether the impact of financialization on cross-correlations represents a welcome improvement in market efficiency or, instead, is a worrisome development”

• Potential negative consequences of financialization
  – ‘Spill over price volatility from outside to commodities markets and also across commodities’ (Tang and Xiong, 2010). But how?
  – Erode the long-run diversification benefits as systematic risk dominates futures return
  – Prone to bubbles as in financial markets

• Potential positive consequences of financialization
  – Reduce the market price of risk with stabilising effect on the oil price (Pirrong, 2011)
  – More efficient derivatives pricing methods through linking futures prices at different maturities (Buyuksahin et al, 2008)
  – Helped physical crude oil markets become more integrated by reducing transaction costs and facilitate arbitrage across geographically distant markets and across crude oil of different quality (Fattouh, 2010)

• Are we asking the right question?
3.3 Granger Causality

• Have price movements typically been preceded by changes in trading positions of hedge funds and other types of financial investors?

• Empirical evidence mixed at best

• Causality cannot be inferred from predictive correlations

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Notes: The change in price is the log change in the spot price of oil. The net positions of the commercial and non-commercial firms are defined as the net (long – short) open position. The null hypothesis is no Granger causality between the two variables. An entry of “Yes” indicates that we reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at the 5 per cent significance level; an entry of “No” indicates that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at the 5 per cent significance level. The number of lags in the Granger causality tests was chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
Net Positions and Oil Prices

Funds net Positions (1,000 contracts)

Swap Dealers net Positions (1,000 contracts)

Funds cut their positions in May 2008, before prices reached historical high levels.

Swap dealers cut their positions when prices increase and increase their positions when prices decline.
3.5 The Inventory-Price Relationship

US Commercial Crude Stocks vs. WTI (1994-2011)

Source: OPEC
Broken Relationship

• Often claimed that relationship broken due to entry of speculators/ index investors
• Underlying static framework

- Speculators drive Prices upwards above equilibrium level
- Encourages production and discourages consumption
- Accumulation in Inventories
- Positive relationship between price and inventories
Inventory-Price Relationship Much More Complex

• Relationship between two endogenous problems could be shifting in response to structural changes or changes in expectations

• Pirrong (2008): Commodity storage problem dynamic & should be analysed in dynamic rational expectation model
  – Forward looking agents respond to increase in variance of demand by increasing inventory holdings which requires prices to increase
  – If variance shocks are volatile enough, relationship between inventories and prices becomes unstable

• Dvir and Rogoff (2009):
  – Agents will increase optimal storage in expectation of higher prices in next period
  – Will lead to higher equilibrium price today when storage is positive
  – Impact of growth shock is magnified: increasing demand when it is high in preparation of higher demand in the future
  – Price volatility higher in presence of storage (contrary to the view that storage lean against the wind)

• “Those searching for evidence of speculative excess need look elsewhere than the price-inventory relation.” (Pirrong, 2008); same conclusion reached by Singleton (2011)
3.6 Shocks in a VAR Framework

- Distinguish between various types of shocks (Kilian and Murphy, 2010) in VAR framework:

  - Shock to the flow of crude oil production (flow supply shock)

  - Shock to the demand for crude oil driven by the global business cycle (flow demand shock)

  - Shock to the demand for above-ground oil inventories arising from forward-looking behaviour ("speculative demand shock")
    - Anticipation of a booming world economy;
    - Speculative demand for oil manifests itself as demand for oil inventories;
    - By including changes in oil inventories in an econometric model able to identify the effects of expectations shifts without explicit measures of expectations

  - Residual shock that captures all structural shocks not otherwise accounted for and has no direct economic interpretation (e.g., weather shocks, shocks to inventory technology or preferences, changes in SPR, technical constraints in refining).
Structural Model of Oil Market

- Monthly data for 1973.2-2009.8

- Four variables all endogenous
  - Percent change in global crude oil production
  - Index of global real activity in deviations from trend
  - Real price of oil
  - Change in above-ground global crude oil inventories

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<th>Flow Supply</th>
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<td>Oil Production</td>
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<td>Inventories</td>
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Historical Decompositions for 1978.6-2009.8

Cumulative Effect of Flow Supply Shock on Real Price of Crude Oil

Cumulative Effect of Flow Demand Shock on Real Price of Crude Oil

Cumulative Effect of Speculative Demand Shock on Real Price of Crude Oil
Other VAR Studies

• Juvenal and Patrella (2011) introduce an additional shock but with questionable identifying restrictions:
  – Financial speculative demand shock reflecting traders’ activity in financial markets
  – Financial speculation shocks second most important driver of oil prices after oil demand shocks
  – Also accounts for increased correlation between oil & other commodities

• Lombardi and Van Robyas (2011) introduce a financial speculation shock
  – Identification based on oil futures spread and futures price
  – Find that destabilizing financial activity can have an impact in the short run but limited in the long run
  – Fundamentals (and expected fundamentals) explain about 90% of oil price movements in the short run

• Lechthaler and Leinert (2012): Include an explicit proxy for precautionary demand
  – Use media sentiment to model expectation driven demand activities; considers news/information to be at the heart of the expectation formation process
  – Expectations have been a major driver of the price of crude oil after 2003. Fundamentals have played a much smaller role
2.8 Structural Calibrated Model

- Fattouh and Mahadeva (2012) build a calibrated finance-macro model to test implications of financialization

- Define financialization in precise manner
  - Lower risk aversion by financial speculators
  - More wealth at their disposable.

- Competing explanations
  - Lower real rates (search for yield)
  - Looser net supply
  - More volatile supply

- Test the financialization hypothesis and competing explanations in one model
Spreads and Players

Expected Spot Price

Expected Spot Price – Futures Price

\[ E_t(P_{t+1}) \]

\[ P_t \]

\[ [F^{t+1}] \]

"The basis" or "the convenience yield"

Financial Speculators

Physical Speculators (unhedged)

Consumers/Producers (unhedged)

Physical Speculators (hedged)
Methodology

• We match the model to the data before 2003
  – It matches the spreads reasonably well

• We experiment with
  – Financialization changes
  – Other changes to the financial layer
  – The physical layer

• We see if the financialization hypotheses predictions are borne out
Financial Participation

Financial speculator's futures position (% change)

- Risk aversion fall (2 to 1.5)
- Wealth + 25%
- Real rate -1.5pp
- 5% more net supply
- Supply volatility +15%
Price Levels

Current and Futures Price (% Change)

- Risk aversion rate (2 to 1.5)
- Wealth + 25%
- Real rate -1.5pp
- Net supply
- Supply volatility +15%

Current vs. Expected Spot
Consumer Welfare

% Extra Compensation Consumers Need

- Risk aversion fall (2 to 1.5)
- Wealth + 25%
- Real rate -1.5 pp
- 5% more net supply
- Supply volatility +15%
4. What Has been Learnt So Far?

- Price co-movement analysis adds little to our understanding of drivers of oil prices
  - What drives this co-movement?
  - Why does it matter?
  - Correlation does not imply causation

- Evidence of Granger causality mixed at best and do not say much about ‘causality’

- Evidence of predictability of futures returns based on inflows is mixed at best and is consistent with other explanations based on market frictions

- The inventory-price relationship should not be used to test for speculation

- Most evidence from VAR analysis suggests that speculation played a limited role in explaining oil price movements during the 2002-2008 oil price cycle; oil demand shocks (current and expected) can account for the oil price rise

- Structural calibrated models suggest that financialization has no impact on key variables including consumer welfare; fundamental factors have much bigger role
Does not imply that entry of financial players has had no impact on oil price formation

• Change in risk aversion of financial players can have an impact on the spot price
• Entry of financial players affects risk premia (Hamilton and Wu, 2011)
  – Significant changes as financial investors (index funds) have become natural counterparts to hedgers
  – Risk premia declined post 2005 and become more volatile (even negative in many instances like in 2009)
• Change in term structure of commodity futures markets (Mou, 2010)
• Increase in herding activity in commodities futures (Buyuksahin et al, 2009)
  – Herding in futures markets driven in part by mimicking behaviour and common trading strategies specifically by hedge funds and floor brokers/traders
  – But have stabilising effect on prices
  – Evidence has been limited so far to this study: An area in need of further research
• Increased correlation across various maturities but different explanations
  – Fattouh and Scaramozzino (2011): Shift in the probability distribution of the mean reversion parameter due to change in expectations
Financial Players and Expectations

• How does the entry of financial players affect the formation of expectations?

• Beauty contest games can arise in difference of opinion framework and heterogeneity of traders (Singleton, 2011; Allen, Morison and Shin, 2006)
  – Market participants form expectations not only in terms of expected fundamentals but also on basis of anticipations of other players’ expectations

• Impact of public information or signals amplified even if do not necessarily reflect large changes in underlying fundamentals
  – Can affect my guess about other players’ guesses

• Market participants tend to focus only on few signals while ignoring others as not possible to coordinate on a large number of signals
  – Inventories, weak dollar, shortages of supply, peak oil

• To what extent these features play out in commodities markets is yet not clear and is need of further research