Po-Hsuan Hsu, University of Hong Kong Hao Liang, Singapore Management University Pedro Matos, University of Virginia - Darden



Leviathan = something that is very large and powerful / a sea monster in scriptural accounts / the <u>political state</u> (source: Merriam-Webster)

Forbes

Leviathan Inc. = state being a major investor in firms listed in stock exchanges (SOE) ... a.k.a. "State Capitalism"




The Economist (2010): "... Western politicians cannot fail to be influenced by the success of emerging countries like **Brazil**, **India** and **China**, where a big role for the state in business seems to be working wonders. **Nine of the world's 30 largest listed firms are emerging-market companies that count the state as their dominant shareholder**. (...)"



Leviathan = something that is very large and powerful / a sea monster in scriptural accounts / the <u>political state</u> (source: <u>Merriam-Webster</u>)


Leviathan Inc. = state being a major investor in firms listed in stock exchanges (SOE) ... a.k.a. "State Capitalism"



Corporate Environmental Engagement = latest race is on "**green-tech**"? (transition from dirty to clean technology, reducing fossil fuel emissions and limiting climate change)



Climate change could be case of market failure so state ownership could be a way to pursue "public interest"?






Figure 1. Total CO2 Emissions Over Time, per Region/Country

This figure presents the 1990-2015 time series of country-specific CO2 emission totals of fossil fuel use and industrial processes. Source: Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) 4.3.2, European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)/PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.

The New York Times

ps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/06/climate/world issions-goals-far-off-course.html?_r=1


<u>2015</u>: Paris climate change agreement to "[hold] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels". drafted by BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and the U.S.


2016: ratified at G20 Hangzhou Summit on "Green finance"



Ban Ki-Moon (UN) Xi Jinping (China)

Barack Obama (US)





The New York Times

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
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
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The Invisible (or Visible?) Hand of State Control

• "Visible Hand" = green industrial policy: Rodrik (2014) "...strong in theory, ambiguous in practice!"

Source: Rodrik, "Green industrial policy" (Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2014)

US: - <u>Laws</u> : Clean Air Act; National Energy Conservation Policy Act; - <u>Tools</u> : Tax Credits (PTCs/ITCs), EPA standards for GHG emissions, Loan guarantees, R&D grants, - <u>Programs</u> : DOE Wind, Solar, Bioenergy, Geothermal Technology, Hydrogen & Fuel Cell Technologies, Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in a majority of states,	Germany: - <u>Laws</u> : Energy Transition (out of nuclear), Energy Concept (GHG emissions), EU Energy and Climate Package (20/20/20), - <u>Tools</u> : R&D funding, Feed-in tariff, Concessional lending/subsidies, Quotas -Programs: Sixth Energy Research Program, EKF, KfW,	China: - <u>Laws</u> : Renewable Energy Law (2006), 12th Five Year Plan (2011–2015): energy efficiency, carbon emissions reduction, and new energies are priorities, - <u>Tools</u> : Feed-in tariffs for solar, wind, Fiscal incentives to support R&D or manufacturing in renewable energies, - <u>Programs</u> : Pilot cap-and-trade in provinces(256mln people, 3.5% of global economy),	India: - <u>Laws</u> : National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008), - <u>Tools</u> : Renewable Energy Certificates for wind, solar, and biomass power plants (but market near collapse), Generation-based Incentives for wind and solar, - Programs: National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency. National Clean Energy Fund (funded by coal tax),
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"Invisible Hand" = state ownership could be a way of providing public goods and

a solution to market failures ("social view")




The Invisible (or Visib

"Visible Hand" = gree ambiguous in practice!



"Invisible Hand" = sta a solution to market fail





President Trump says the Paris climate accord "disadvantages" US

Paris climate deal: Trump announces US will withdraw June, 2017:

President Donald Trump has announced that the US is withdrawing from the 2015 Paris climate agreement.

...strong in theory,

"Green industrial policy" (Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2014)

India:

5]: energy

Der


-trade in

y Law (2006), 12th - Laws: National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008), ... ons reduction, and Tools: Renewable Energy Certificates for wind, solar, and biomass power plants (but solar, wind, Fiscal market near collapse), Generation-based Incentives for wind and solar, ... - Programs: National Mission for Enhanced ble energies, ... **Energy Efficiency. National Clean Energy** 3.5% of global Fund (funded by coal tax), __

f providing public goods and



The Invisible (or Visible?) Hand of State Control



This study:

- International data on state control and ownership (BvD ORBIS, manual) & Environmental Engagement ASSET4 (also MSCI, Sustainalytics)
- Sample period: 2004-2014
- 45 countries
- Main Findings:
- Positive association between SOE and Environmental scores
- Time Variation: post- vs. pre-Copenhagen Accord (12/2009) Fukushima (3/2011)
 + changes in government political orientation (causation?)
- Effects are stronger for firms ...
 - in oil & gas industry from emerging economies (Asia-Pacific and Latin America), countries lacking energy resources and in conflict with neighboring countries
 - with direct domestic state ownership, rather than being invested by SWF
 ... other blockholder types are not associated with Environmental scores.

Literature on State SOEs:



Agency view : SOE managers are chosen for political reasons, have low-powered incentives, not transparent, poor monitoring by boards packed with politicians. (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999; Megginson, 2003), governments bail out inefficient firms (Kornai, 1979, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998) and lead to inefficient capital allocation (Chen, Jiang, Ljunqvist, Lu and Zhou (2017)).

[Political view: SOEs are captured by politicians to fulfil their political agenda, namely to pursue their political career objectives (Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Sapienza (2004)), rather than maximizing social welfare.]

- **Social view:** SOEs can be effective in addressing environmental externalities
 - Private sector: maximize profits
 - Public sector: deal with externalities and market failures generated by the private sector during profit maximization

► Literature on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) < SKIP >

- <u>Positive effects on shareholder value</u>: Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen (2009), Servaes &Tamayo (2013), Hong & Liskovich (2015), Ferrell, Liang & Renneboog (2016), Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017)
- Negative effects: Masulis and Reza (2015), Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2016)
- Literature on (institutional) ownership and ESG
- <u>US evidence</u>: shareholder proposals and voting (Del Guercio & Tran (2012)) and private engagements (Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015))
- International evidence: Hopner, Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, and Zhou (2016)
 - Foreign institutional investors impact positively G (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011))
 - Foreign institutional investors impact E&S only when they come from countries with high E&S social norms, with firms from the Americas having no significant impact (Dyck, Lins, Roth & Wagner (2016))


Sample of publicly-listed firms in 45 countries (2004-2014)

State control and ownership data:

-> Main variable (BvD ORBIS):

State_own = dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate owner is the government or a public authority, and 0 otherwise (at least **25%** of voting rights throughout the

pyramid ownership chain).



... cross-checked **manually** with FACTSET and public sources

- example: Zijin Mining is majority owned (>25%) by Minxi Xinghang State-Owned Assets Investment Co. Ltd., which is a private company controlled by the Chinese government

... 3,624 => 4,861 firm-year observations are SOEs (State_own = 1)

-> Alternative variable (DATASTREAM):

Government_held = the % of floating shares held directly by government (if > 5%)

... but lower quality (and only first-layer of ownership)!

2. DATA

3. RESULTS

State ownership data:

Forbes Global 2000 firms: (2010)




forbes rank	GUO_state	government held	ENVSCORE
 01_JPMorgan Chas	0	0	92.5
02_General Elect	0	0	95.1
03_Bank of Ameri	0	0	77.5
04_ExxonMobil	0	0	94.2
05_ICBC	1	47	87.9
06_Banco Santand	0	0	93.2
07_Wells Fargo	0	0	91.9
08_HSBC Holdings	0	0	93.4
09_Royal Dutch S	0	0	89.7
10_BP	0	0	89.9
11_BNP Paribas	0	11	93.0
12_PetroChina	1	0	57.5
13_AT&T	0	 _	92.7
14_Wal-Mart Stor	0	0	86.6
15_Berkshire Hat	0	0	9.4
16_Gazprom	1	49	82.0
17_China Constru	1	6	53.3
18_Petrobras	1	56	91.7
19_Total	0	0	89.7
20_Chevron	0	0	90.4
21_Barclays	0	7	94.1
22_Bank of China	1	0	79.6
23_Allianz	0	0	93.5
24_GDF Suez	1	36	90.1
25_E ON	0	0	91.6
26_Goldman Sachs	0	0	92.1
27_EDF Group	1	84	92.9
28_AXA Group	0	0	93.4
29_Lloyds	1	41	90.0
30_Proctor & Gam	0	0	94.7
31_ENI	1	20	89.0

If State_own =1

. . .

ESG data: Thomson Reuter's ASSET4 (ex: Liang and Renneboog (2017))




ENVSCORE: "The environmental pillar measures a **company's impact on living and non-living natural systems**, including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to generate long term shareholder value." ENVSCORE (environmental scores) SOCSCORE (for social scores) CGVSCORE (corporate governance scores)

Note: all scores are industry-demeaned (range: 0 to 100 , mean = 50), universe = 4,500 firms in major indices, sources = companies & public/media/NGOs

1. INTRODUCTION

2. DATA

ESG data: THOMSON REUTERS (previously known as "ASSET4")



► ENER (emission reduction): measures a

company's management commitment and effectiveness towards reducing environmental emission in the production and operational processes. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), waste, hazardous waste, water discharges, spills or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with environmental organisations to reduce the environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community.


► ENPI (product innovation): measures a


company's management commitment and effectiveness **towards supporting the research and development** of eco-efficient products or services. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce the environmental costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities through new environmental technologies and processes or eco-designed, dematerialized products with extended durability.


► ENRR (resource reduction category):

measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards achieving **an efficient use of natural resources** in the production process. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management.

	Table 1	. Forbes T	op-Ranked (Global (Compan	ies, 201	0	<	SKI
Forbes Rank 2010	Country	State_own	ENVSCORE		•	•	SOCSCORE	CGVSCORE	
				ENER	ENPI	ENRR			
1. JPMorgan Chase	US	0	92.50	76.57	97.25	87.06	66.48	72.70	
2. General Electric	US	0	95.06	94.53	97.69	95.05	90.78	94.49	
3. Bank of America	US	0	77.54	48.28	86.94	80.64	67.41	82.06	
4. ExxonMobil	US	0	94.19	92.48	94.75	93.17	91.67	86.78	
5.ICBC	CN	1	87.86	72.09	95.19	85.65	78.27	78.98	
6. Banco Santander	ES	0	93.21	92.03	87.77	93.30	95.23	89.16	
7. Wells Fargo	US	0	91.92	93.11	88.13	84.08	59.39	82.47	
8. HSBC Holdings	GB	0	93.40	93.63	87.41	93.41	86.73	84.91	
9. Royal Dutch Shell	GB	0	89.69	79.54	89.40	92.34	78.23	87.56	
10. BP	GB	0	89.86	89.45	75.50	89.25	87.12	83.28	
11. BNP Paribas	FR	0	93.04	87.99	97.34	90.84	94.07	90.89	
12. PetroChina	CN	1	57.50	64.25	15.44	75.30	81.13	19.74	
13. AT&T	US	0	92.71	93.39	88.22	88.37	79.26	91.63	
14. Wal-Mart Stores	US	0	86.55	69.81	71.89	88.95	75.46	94.06	
15. Berkshire Hathaway	US	0	9.36	9.39	14.92	8.92	3.75	63.05	
16. Gazprom	RU	1	81.95	91.28	53.11	79.10	76.46	6.99	
17. China Construction Bank	CN CN	1	53.33	34.44	87.36	35.94	81.45	28.92	
18. Petrobras	BR	1	91.67	90.93	84.42	88.34	93.80	34.01	
19. Total	FR	0	89.70	77.73	87.75	83.24	83.63	65.24	
20. Chevron	US	0	90.42	86.96	87.89	82.06	63.51	77.78	
21. Barclays	GB	0	94.11	90.95	94.89	92.44	93.23	86.60	
22. Bank of China	CN	1	79.61	37.93	95.50	88.15	82.44	49.77	
23. Allianz	DE	0	93.50	93.66	88.13	93.40	93.40	78.88	
24. GDF Suez	FR	1	90.06	92.34	88.28	78.89	95.71	76.96	
25. E ON	DE	0	91.60	94.91	85.84	84.94	96.59	29.78	
26. Goldman Sachs	US	0	92.12	78.15	87.37	93.51	53.77	74.37	
27. EDF Group	FR	1	92.86	84.90	97.53	88.77	96.13	33.16	
28. AXA Group	FR	0	93.39	85.18	95.44	93.31	94.37	82.90	
29. Lloyds	GB	1	90.01	92.48	69.86	92.90	93.20	73.90	
30. Procter & Gamble	US	0	94.69	92.76	97.41	93.50	92.54	81.51	
31. ENI	IT	1	89.02	83.41	81.75	84.79	96.11	59.61	











Figure IA. 4. Average State Ownership of Publicly-listed Firms, per Geographic Region and Year





T2: Univariate Tests (State_own = 1) vs. (State_own = 0):

Country	Obs	State_own	ENVSCORE	State	_own	p-value
				=1	=0	(1 - 0)
Total	28,890	0.066	51.51	57.4	51.1	0.00
Emerging	3,558	0.248	49.20	50.9	48.6	0.00**
Developed	25,332	0.040	51.83	62.9	51.4	0.00***

-> Internet Appendix: SOEs better environmental performance in 31 out of 45 countries of the sample!

► T4: Baseline Regression:

unit of observation = (firm *i*, country *j*, year *t*) Environmental $_{i,j,t} = \alpha + \beta State_Own _{i,j,t} + \gamma Controls _{i,j,t} + Fixed Effects,$ Environmental $_{i,j,t}$: ENVSCORE and sub-scores ENER (emission), ENPI (product), and ENRR (resource) StateOwn _{i,j,t}: SOE dummy

Controls *i,j,t*: institutional ownership, total assets in log, leverage, market-to-book ratio, ROA, GPD per capita

Standard errors clustered at the firm level

1. INTRODUCTION

Table 2. Univariate Tests of State Ownership and Environmental Performance

	Ta	able 2.	Univaria	te Tests of	State Ow	mersh	ip and	Env	ironme	ntal P	erforn	nance	<
				Panel	A: Univariat	e Comp	arisons t	y Cou	ntry				
Country	Unique firm no.	Obs	State_own	ENVSCORE	State_own =1	=0	p- value (1 - 0)	-	ENER	ENPI	ENRR	SOCSCORE	CGVSCORE
Total	4,009	28,890	0.066	51.51	57.40	51.13	0.00		51.45	49.16	51.72	52.07	53.36
merging		3,558	0.248	49.20	50.94	48.58	0.00	**	50.08	45.09	50.81	55.50	29.05
reloped		25,332	0.040	51.83	62.94	51.41	0.00	***	51.64	49.73	51.85	51.59	56.77
AT	18	167	0.224	56.65	78.42	49.88	0.00	***	54.98	55.25	53.66	56.08	33.32
AU	350	1,855	0.012	36.91	47.95	36.80	0.07	*	40.15	34.69	39.16	39.30	63.42
BE	27	237	0.072	56.50	64.10	56.13	0.34		56.53	50.74	56.67	52.96	50.56
BR	83	401	0.194	53.51	68.79	49.78	0.00	***	52.50	46.89	56.34	64.11	27.24
CA	265	1,635	0.018	39.01	33.81	38.98	0.27		42.09	36.23	40.45	39.72	73.74
CH CL	66 20	485 115	0.046 0.211	58.41 40.19	67.57 39.81	57.95 40.54	0.15 0.91		57.15 39.43	54.97 39.81	58.25 43.05	56.61 44.91	47.10 9.26
CL	44	218	0.211	26.01	28.92	20.58	0.00	***	24.39	38.47	23.13	25.40	24.59
CO	44	218	0.600	48.77	28.92 59.70	33.50	0.00	**	24.39 54.64	38.17	23.13 50.86	71.34	28.21
cz	3	20	0.364	51.00	61.92	44.76	0.02	***	46.32	51.33	51.43	70.32	18.27
DE	89	734	0.079	67.38	69.65	67.11	0.45		64.75	65.09	66.30	68.48	34.59
DK	24	227	0.000	57.10	05.05	56.94	0.45		54.92	54.79	58.09	54.07	38.02
EG	11	55	0.170	19.55	10.55	21.15	0.00		21.37	25.05	20.67	27.24	8.64
ES	55	420	0.024	71.90	87.47	71.75	0.00	***	71.62	60.63	72.95	78.12	50.24
FI	27	244	0.169	76.11	88.02	73.94	0.00	***	69.22	78.39	71.03	70.35	60.87
FR	99	901	0.116	76.93	79.53	76.67	0.24		74.56	70.22	76.66	78.17	55.07
GB	361	2,893	0.020	60.14	63.34	60.10	0.39		62.80	48.16	62.88	63.31	73.89
GR	22	192	0.287	50.25	69.69	42.92	0.00	***	53.39	37.45	55.32	50.69	17.72
ΗK	142	920	0.185	34.69	40.49	33.78	0.00	***	33.12	36.85	37.07	35.98	36.48
HU	4	22	0.227	75.69	35.23	87.58	0.00		76.63	70.86	71.43	78.51	41.16
ID	31	139	0.477	46.41	46.58	46.82	0.96		51.94	37.26	48.70	62.82	26.03
IE	14	117	0.103	44.03	72.69	40.76	0.00	***	45.64	41.01	45.12	36.74	64.48
IL	14	82	0.000	42.73		42.34			37.24	40.99	49.35	45.73	37.17
IN	75	362	0.218	54.98	52.61	55.62	0.44		54.42	48.83	59.16	58.84	29.11
IT	48	426	0.231	55.00	81.41	46.84	0.00	***	53.93	52.84	56.28	64.23	43.97
ЛР	416	3,939	0.016	62.23	70.17	62.12	0.03	**	61.94	63.09	57.26	47.32	11.96
KR	109	564	0.075	61.73	65.77	61.34	0.31		61.18	63.98	56.14	57.05	13.79
LU	3	18	0.000	60.19	51.50	60.19			52.85	57.76	60.94	50.93	58.92
MA	3	19	0.056	27.30	54.56	23.33	-		25.57	27.54	33.38	54.64	5.45
MX	24	115	0.000	43.00	51.07	42.73	0.00	***	45.33	34.56	47.50	45.06	13.16 46.94
MY NL	44 37	207 286	0.490 0.017	40.12 69.67	51.97 85.72	29.13 69.38	0.00	***	44.71 67.06	37.32 63.14	40.53 70.53	49.12 77.46	46.94 64.51
NO	18	280 174	0.017	66.21	85.72	58.19	0.00	***	63.98	64.62	61.74	69.81	63.62
NZ	18	65	0.293	44.31	85.57 76.07	38.54	0.00	***	43.31	45.98	41.67	41.47	62.47
PE	1	7	0.000	27.40	70.07	27.40	0.00		41.28	18.82	33.43	31.99	51.66
PH	14	63	0.000	44.86	42.04	46.01	0.68		42.42	43.30	48.75	45.31	28.78
PL	26	128	0.457	35.39	44.60	27.94	0.00	***	38.78	34.78	34.85	42.30	23.24
PT	12	103	0.140	67.44	78.67	65.14	0.04	**	69.26	56.18	67.15	76.88	56.78
RU	34	187	0.384	46.48	56.83	40.14	0.00	***	49.90	34.90	52.53	54.68	28.74
SE	50	454	0.047	67.71	82.53	66.92	0.00	***	64.58	66.35	64.50	64.94	54.29
SG	49	414	0.380	36.98	45.66	32.19	0.00	***	37.82	35.14	40.67	40.79	43.78
TH	30	136	0.415	49.30	68.88	35.19	0.00	***	48.04	47.37	50.58	59.71	45.53
TR	24	135	0.250	51.04	34.88	55.89	0.00		51.49	51.33	49.65	55.79	22.47
US	1086	8,536	0.003	44.23	19.42	44.31	0.00		42.95	45.00	44.82	47.61	74.15
ZA	121	445	0.058	53.33	59.25	52.54	0.14		55.27	40.54	60.46	71.34	60.76

1. INTRODUCTION

Table 2. (continued)

< <u>SKIP</u> >

Panel B: Univariate Comparisons by Major Industry								
Industry	Obs.	State_own		ENVSCORE			SOCSCORE	CGVSCORE
			All	State own=1	State own=0	p-value (1 - 0)		
Basic Materials	3,015	0.056	55.58	59.84	55.40	0.07	53.39	54.89
Consumer Goods	3,370	0.019	61.55	47.15	61.90	0.00	57.76	46.95
Consumer Services	3,992	0.023	41.05	52.56	40.79	0.00	46.35	53.55
Financials	5,059	0.069	43.23	46.36	43.04	0.06	46.02	49.99
Health Care	1,633	0.010	43.79	20.76	44.06	0.00	50.63	55.82
Industrials	5,610	0.053	59.08	53.83	59.38	0.00	55.40	52.47
Oil & Gas	2,061	0.126	45.48	64.61	42.69	0.00	48.52	63.62
Technology	1,960	0.021	51.69	63.00	51.46	0.03	51.53	58.82
Telecommunications	771	0.317	55.43	63.37	51.95	0.00	62.53	52.13
Utilities	1405	0.256	63.53	64.80	63.32	0.36	62.40	55.66
Total	28,876	0.066	51.52	57.40	51.14	0.00	52.08	53.36

► T4: Baseline Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent var.:	ENVSCORE	ENVSCORE	ENER	ENER	ENPI	ENPI	ENRR	ENRR
State_own	3.991***	2.507*	4.385***	2.857**	2.606	1.306	4.703***	2.702*
	(1.524)	(1.410)	(1.472)	(1.384)	(1.670)	(1.603)	(1.511)	(1.397)
Institution_own		3.323*		2.906		3.665*		3.808*
		(1.896)		(1.953)		(2.052)		(2.007)
Ln(Assets)		6.334***		6.608***		4.074***		6.916***
		(0.310)		(0.291)		(0.305)		(0.328)
Leverage		0.0230		0.0298*		-0.00714		0.0288
		(0.0175)		(0.0180)		(0.0186)		(0.0181)
MTB		0.248**		0.276**		0.127		0.342***
		(0.113)		(0.112)		(0.127)		(0.123)
ROA		0.0915***		0.0975***		0.0560*		0.139***
		(0.0268)		(0.0277)		(0.0307)		(0.0298)
Ln(GDP)		2.536		1.191		0.0704		4.322**
		(1.735)		(1.804)		(2.034)		(1.987)
Observations	28,890	28,890	28,890	28,890	28,890	28,890	28,890	28,890
Number of firm_id	4,009	4,009	4,009	4,009	4,009	4,009	4,009	4,009
Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

T5: Salient Environmental Events [A]: 12/2009 Copenhagen Accord



- The Copenhagen Accord is the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, whose round ended in 2012. Raised governmental and corporate awareness of the severity of climate change.
- Caveats: (1) non-legally-binding; (2) confounding (but reinforcing!) event: Deepwater Horizon oil spill in early 2010

Panel A 200	9 Copenhagen Agreen	nent: All Countrie	с С
T UNOTA. 200	ENVSCORE	ENER	CO ₂
	(1)	(2)	(3)
State_own × Post 2009	2.428*	3.019**	-0.059*
	(1.406)	(1.432)	(0.034)
State_own	0.814	0.753	0.031
	(1.819)	(1.780)	(0.037)
Observations	28,890	28,890	13,245
Number of Firms	4,009	4,009	2,304
Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
,			

► T5:	Panel B. Copenha	agen Agreement: F	E.s and Subsam	ples						
F 15.			Asia Pacific &	North America,						
	Dep. Variable = ENVSCORE	All Countries	Latin America	Europe & M.E.						
		(1)	(2)	(3)						
	State_own × Post 2009	2.419**	7.512***	-2.429						
		(1.105)	(2.311)	(1.686)						
	State_own	-1.352	-1.577	-2.566						
		(2.275)	(3.920)	(2.895)						
	Observations	28,890	9,546	19,344						
	Number of Firms	4,009	1,448	2,561						
	Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes						
	Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes						
	Panel C. 2009 Copenhagen Agreement: Subsamples by CO ₂ per capita									
		High CO ₂ µ	per Low	$CO_2 per$						
	Dep. Variable = ENVSCORE	capita	(capita						
		(1)		(3)						
	State_own × Post 2009	3.254**		0.714						
		(1.598)	(1.826)						
	State_own	3.990*	,	1.245						
		(2.138)	(2	2.023)						
	Observations	8,263	;	3,340						
	Number of Firms	2,583		1,149						
	Country & Year FE	Yes		Yes						
	Event window	2008-201	1 20	08-2011						

► T5: [B]: 3/2011 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster

- Most significant nuclear incident since Chernobyl



- Germany accelerated plans to close its nuclear power reactors

Par	nel D. Fukushima	a Nuclear Disasi	ter	
	All	Utilities	Non-utilities	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State_own × Post 2011	2.866***	6.233***	3.118***	2.947***
	(0.912)	(2.156)	(1.030)	(1.029)
State_own	1.207	0.707	0.296	0.550
	(1.504)	(3.644)	(1.694)	(1.680)
Utilities				10.33***
				(1.878)
State_own × Utilities				-0.380
				(3.489)
Utilities × Post 2011				-6.232***
				(1.491)
State_own × Post 2011 × Utilities				4.129*
				(2.495)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	28,441	1,405	27,036	28,890
Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

► T6: Changes in Government Political Orientation

	Left – Ce	nter/Right	Center/L	eft – Right
Dependent variable		ENVSCORE (one-year forward)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State_own	2.125	1.980	2.127	1.963
	(1.822)	(1.805)	(1.821)	(1.805)
Year government leaning right	-0.608			
(from left to center/right)	(0.504)			
State_own × Year government leaning right	-0.291			
(from left to center/right)	(1.942)			
Year government leaning left		-0.563		
(from center/right to left)		(0.510)		
State_own × Year government leaning left		3.567**		
(from center/right to left)		(1.577)		
Year government leaning right			-0.210	
(from center/left to right)			(0.472)	
State_own × Year government leaning right			-0.583	
(from center/left to right)			(1.738)	
Year government leaning left				-0.931*
(from right to center/left)				(0.538)
State_own × Year government leaning left				4.731***
(from right to center/left)				(1.721)
Observations	21,311	21,311	21,311	21,311
Number of firm_id	3,475	3,475	3,475	3,475
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Control variables

Country & Year FE

Yes

Yes

T7: Cross-Country Variation

	Panel A. By Lev	el of Econor	nic Develop	oment	
		(1)		(2)	
		Emerging Ma	arkets Deve	eloped Cour	ntries
State_ov	wn	3.976**		1.592	
		(1.806)		(1.937)	
Observa	itions	3,558		25,332	
Control	variables	Yes		Yes	
Country	& Year FE	Yes		Yes	
	Pa	inel B. By Reg	ions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ion	Africa & Middle	Asia Pacific	Europe	Latin	Nortl
	East			America	Ameri
e_own	-0.984	5.238**	0.283	6.851*	-3.90
	(5.236)	(2.383)	(2.152)	(3.805)	(3.71
ervations	736	8,882	8,437	664	10,17

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

► T8: Channels & Disentangling Theories

- **Social view:** SOEs can be effective in addressing environmental externalities
 - Especially in strategically important and environmentally sensitive industries (e.g. Oil & Gas)
 - Especially when the operation is more domestic
 - Especially in countries where environmental issues are stronger concerns
 - Is not a function of environmental regulations
- Agency/political views: SOEs are captured by politicians to fulfil their political agenda, or are run by self-interested managers
 - The effect is negative (agency view)
 - The effect depends on the political connectedness of the CEO

► T8: Channels

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State_own	1.720	4.602**	1.438	3.524**
	(1.475)	(1.636)	(1.828)	(1.681)
Oil & Gas	-3.859***			
	(1.454)			
State_own × Oil & Gas	10.90**			
	(5.406)			
Foreign sales		0.054***		
		(0.010)		
State_own × Foreign sales		-0.043*		
		(0.026)		
Energy security risk			-0.0149***	
			(0.00382)	
State_own × Energy security risk			0.0118***	
			(0.00422)	
Neighboring countries conflict				-8.042***
				(2.400)
State_own × Neighboring countries				13.72***
conflict				(3.580)
Controls, Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	28,890	24,795	24,819	21,493

► T8: Channels

	(5)	(6)
State_own	3.374*	2.371*
	(1.770)	(1.367)
Environmental regulation	6.880***	
	(1.314)	
State_own × Environmental regulation	1.930	
	(1.660)	
Political connection of CEO		0.222
		(0.807)
State_own × Political connection of CEO		0.800
		(2.244)
Controls, Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	27,798	28,890

T9-A: State Ownership Special? (vs. other > 5% free-float blockholders)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Government_held	0.063**									
	(0.027)									
Foreign holdings		0.0017								
		(1.488)								
Cross holdings			-0.007							
			(0.014)							
Pension fund held				-0.314***						
				(0.076)						
Investment co. held					-0.038**					
					(0.016)					
Employee held						-0.097***				
						(0.018)				
Other holdings							0.002			
							(0.031)	0 0 40+++		
Strategic holdings								-0.042***		
Democratic installation								(0.010)	4 507	
Domestic inst. held									-1.537	
Fancian inst hald									(2.310)	7 505***
Foreign inst. held										7.585***
Controlo	Vaa	Vee	Vee	Vee	Vaa	Vaa	Vee	Vaa	Vee	(2.419)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,721	28,659	-		28,724		-	28,724 Xaa		28,890 Xoo
Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

T9-B: Different Forms of State Ownership

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	ENVSCORE	ENVSCORE	ENVSCORE	ENVSCORE
State_own	-0.310	0.560		2.502*
	(2.790)	(2.811)		(1.411)
Domestic_own	0.736	-7.310***		
	(1.083)	(2.279)		
State_own x Domestic_own	3.845	6.812*	7	
	(3.807)	(3.696)		_
Domestic_State_own			4.056**	
			(1.896)	
SWF				0.456
				(1.437)
Observations	25,124	3,766	28,890	28,890
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sampla	OECD	Emerging		Eull Sampla
Sample	Countries	Countries	Full Sample	Full Sample

► T10: Alternative ESG Measures

		(1)	(2)
		MSCI Environmental	Sustainalytics
	Dependent var.:	Pillar Score	Environmental Score
_			
	State_own	0.712**	2.045*
		(0.332)	(1.101)
	Inst_own	-0.375	5.813***
		(0.400)	(1.912)
	Ln(Assets)	0.343***	2.074***
		(0.0580)	(0.413)
	Leverage	0.139*	0.017***
	-	(0.0801)	(0.013)
	MTB	0.426	0.374*
		(0.335)	(0.215)
	ROA	0.0658***	0.099
		(0.0157)	(0.061)
	Ln(GDP)	41.73 [´]	5.111*
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(115.2)	(3.036)
		· · · · ·	
	Observations	1,383	3,300
	R-squared	0.119	0.204
	Country FE	Yes	Yes
	Model	Cross-section OLS	Pooled OLS
	INICACI		

• T11: Shareholder Value and Firm Performance

	(1)	(2)
	Market-to-Book	5-year ROA
	Assets	
State_own	-0.0088	0.310
	(0.0993)	(0.499)
ENVSCORE	0.0024***	0.0046***
	(0.0006)	(0.0016)
State_own × ENVSCORE	-0.0015	-0.0043
	(0.0014)	(0.0053)
Observations	26,163	11,969
Control variables	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes

T12: Other ESG Pillars - Social and Governance?

	(1)	(2)
Dependent var .:	SOCSCOR	E CGVSCORE
State_own	2.233*	0.917
	(1.284)	(1.099)
Observations	28,890	28,881
Number of firms	4,009	4,009
Control variables	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes

WORK IN PROGRESS:

- Econometrics:
 - Industry-Year FEs
 - Changes:
 - Long lead/lag changes
 - Climate change: Copenhagen -> Abnormal Temperature shocks (Choi, Gao, Jiang (2018))
- Sample cuts:
 - AsiaPac & LatAm -> by MktCap/GDP
- Environmental regulation
-

Conclusions:

- Using a sample of public firms in 45 countries (2004-2014), we find
 - SOEs tend to have higher engagement in environmental issues
 - We do not find such a pattern for other blockholding types
 - The role of SOEs on environmental engagement is more pronounced in
 - Oil & Gas sector
 - Emerging economies (Asia-Pacific and Latin America)
 - Countries lacking energy resources
 - Countries with conflicts with neighboring countries
- Policy implications: there is a role of "Leviathan Inc." in dealing with externalities in the economy!