Poverty, Exclusion, and Dissent

Support for Regimes in Developing Countries

Raj M. Desai[†] **Anders Olofsgård**[‡] **Tarik M. Yousef**[§]

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Abstract

Poverty is associated with political conflict in developing countries, but evidence of individual grievances translating into dissent among the poor is mixed. We analyze survey data from 40 developing nations to understand the determinants radicalism, support for violence, and participation in legal anti-regime actions as petitions, demonstrations, and strikes. In particular, we examine the role of perceived political and economic inequities. Our findings suggest that individuals who feel marginalized tend to harbor extremist resentments against the government, but they are generally less likely to join collective political movements that aim to instigate regime changes. This potentially explains the commonly-observed pattern in low- and middle-income countries whereby marginalized groups, despite their political attitudes and high-levels of community engagement, are more difficult to mobilize in nation-wide movements. We also find that arenas for active political participation (beyond voting) are more likely to be dominated by upper-middle income groups who are committed, ultimately, to preserving the status quo. Suppressing these forms of political action may thus be counterproductive, if it pushes these groups towards more radical preferences. Finally, our findings suggest that the poor, in developing nations, may be caught in a vicious circle of self-exclusion and greater marginalization.

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[†] Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and Wolfensohn Center for Development, Brookings Institution. E-mail: desair@georgetown.edu.
[‡] Department of Economics and Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics. E-mail: afo2@georgetown.edu.
[§] Dubai School of Government. E-mail: Tarik.Yousef@dsg.ae.

Introduction

A central assumption of research on state fragility is that poverty is associated with violence. Most of the world's poorest live in conflict-ridden societies. While cross-country evidence shows a strong relationship between income levels and conflict, the micro-level evidence is mixed. In this paper we examine the determinants of three categories of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes in the developing world: (1) radicalism and support for revolution; (3) support for violence against the state; and (3) participation in (legal) anti-governmental actions. We focus primarily on the effects of wealth and poverty and on perceptions of political and economic inequities.

The problem of legitimacy is at the heart of effective government. Governments are better able to function where its citizens are motivated by a "willingness to cooperate . . . backed by coercion" (Levi 2006). Naturally, that willingness is part of a social contract whereby citizens consent to be governed in exchange for the provision of public goods. For governments in poor countries, moreover, the challenge of good government is often placed alongside the imperative of reducing poverty. But if it is generally accepted that good government depends crucially on what Levi has called the "quasi-voluntary compliance" of the governed, there is much less agreement on the determinants of political engagement, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals in low- and middle-income countries. Understanding individual- or household-level determinants of protest and dissent requires a better understanding of the political lives of citizens in low- and middle-income countries.

Using *World Values Survey* data we examine the sources of anti-regime behavior among approximately 44,000 individuals in over 40 lower- and middle-income countries,

identifying whether the factors that drive radicalism and revolutionary preferences also determine other modes of political action. We focus, in particular, on the role of economic and political grievances. Intuitively, these grievances should generate anti-regime attitudes. The question, however, is the manner in which those attitudes map to concrete actions. Citizens have, generally speaking, several options between two poles: at one end, actions within the existing legal order; at the other, open revolt. We investigate the types of responses that perceived injustices produce.

Our results suggest that economic and political grievances breed both radicalism *and* exclusion, particularly among the poorest. We find that individuals who are dissatisfied with the political and economic inequities are more likely to nurture revolutionary preferences, and are more likely to support violent action against incumbent governments. But they are also less likely to be politically engaged. If true, this would suggest that the poor in developing nations may be caught in a vicious cycle of increasing alienation, whereby the gap between their allegiances to their government and that of their better-off counterparts grows ever wider. Our analysis is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related literature, and in Section 3 we present the data, and motivate our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our results, and we conclude in Section 5.

The Political Economy of Dissent

Over 70% of the more than one billion persons living on less than $1 per day are currently in a civil war or have recently been through one (Collier 2007). Statistically, a low-per capita income is one of the more robust determinants of the risk of internal

conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Rice 2006). Conflicts, once begun, perpetuate destitution by perpetuating hunger, destroying assets (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006), spreading disease (Pedersen 2002) and degrading the environment (Dudley et al. 2002).

Yet sub-national, household, and individual-level evidence of the connection between poverty and violence is often mixed, or at odds with cross-national evidence. District-level evidence, for example, shows a positive connection between community poverty and the likelihood of conflict in Uganda (Deininger 2003) and in the Philippines (Malapit et al. 2003); evidence from Colombia (Sánchez and Chacón 2003) and from Indonesia (Barron et al. 2004), however, show no such connection. An events-analysis of Indonesia, by contrast, finds an inverted-U shaped relationship between income levels and violence, with rising incomes increasing the likelihood of violence but lowering the likelihood as communities increase income levels beyond a certain threshold (Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007). Analyses of terrorist events, finally, show little connection between individual poverty and participation in terrorism (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Piazza 2006).

Meanwhile, when it comes to more common (legal, non-violent) forms of political participation—voting, petitioning, joining interest groups, etc.—the evidence is equally mixed. Cross-national studies of developing countries once found support for the "modernization thesis" that those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to be politically engaged (Powell 1982; Huntington and Nelson 1976; Lipset et al. 1993). More recent evidence finds that many developing countries still conform to this expectation (Blais 2000). Other surveys of participation in developing countries, by

contrast, find that participation is often greater among poorer households. Survey evidence from several countries in Latin America, for example, finds that poverty is positively related to partisan activism (Booth and Seligson 2006). Similarly, in India civic participation among disadvantaged households is greater than that of richer households (Diwakar 2008; Besley et al. 2005).

What then, are the factors that shape individuals' willingness to participate in collective acts of protest or violence? The distinction between "preferences" and "opportunities" is crucial since that which determines attitudes may not motivate action against regimes ((Hirshleifer 1993). Anti-governmental political actions—which are generally risky—do not necessarily follow discontent. First, grievances and perceived inequities or "deprivation" alone, of course, are unlikely to destabilize or threaten governments. Second, evidence from studies of regime durability and transition shows the myriad ways in which groups that are more likely to act upon their discontent can be selectively pacified (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Anti-poverty programs have often lavished benefits on politically relevant groups rather than the poorest (Schady 2000; Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2003)). Rentier states have used natural-resource revenues to fund social programs targeted to key constituencies (Aslaksen and Torvik 2006; Chaudhry 1997). And these generous social expenditures and public employment opportunities have tended to create and reinforce allegiances to the state that have proven deeply resilient (Yousef 2004).

All governmental behavior takes place in the shadow of conflict, that is, against the prospect of widespread public non-compliance, resistance, or revolt. Consequently, the ability to overcome collective-action problems is at the core of the credible threat of

dissent, since actual non-compliance ultimately requires coordination. And different collective-action capabilities across groups ultimately make the difference between what Georg Simmel famously referred to as "sterile excitations" and actual mobilization.

In sum, the cross-national evidence of strong, causal links between economic deprivation and political turmoil are at odds with some community- and individual-level data. In particular, little is known about the link between attitudes and actions, and the circumstances by which marginalization leads to legal or extra-legal (and violent) responses. Opinion/values surveys can illuminate the conditions under which endemic discontent produces anti-regime sentiments, and when these sentiments lead to individual acts of resistance.

Data and Methods

We rely on data from the *World Values Survey* (WVS), an international survey of attitudes towards political and cultural issues across 80 countries conducted in four waves between 1981 and 2004. The WVS is constructed of representative national samples of the populations in these countries, but our primary interest is not in the country-level means or other indices. Rather, we are interested in individual-specific motivations, and therefore use individual responses in our analysis. We focus on three main dependent variables: radicalism (mainly, the preference for "revolution," but also self-positioning on a left-right ideological spectrum), the support for violence against the government, and a range of actual (self-reported) political activities. In addition, we generally restrict (with some exceptions) our sample to approximately 40 lower- and middle-income countries.

The problems of comparability when respondents are asked to use ordinal response categories are well known. Different respondents may interpret subjective questions in different ways based on unobservable characteristics. Ordinal scales, moreover, may mean different things to different respondents based on idiosyncratic factors such as mood or overall optimism. Individual-level perceptions would similarly be affected by measurement error where identical individuals may have unequal probabilities of answering questions about their own political preferences in the same way. Additionally, the measurement error in subjective responses may be correlated with a wide variety of individual characteristics and behaviors (King and Wand 2007; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).

"Anchoring vignettes" or other hypothetical questions to establish baselines that could normally correct survey responses for inter-personal incomparability, however, are not included in the WVS. Consequently, we attempt to correct our specifications in the following manner: in all estimations, we include a "bias" proxy. We derive that proxy by regressing a "life satisfaction" response variable (coded from 1, "dissatisfied" to 10, "satisfied") against a "freedom of choice and control" response variable (also coded from 1 to 10 in terms of degree of control respondents report to have over their lives), along with country- and time-fixed effects, and taking into account population-sampling weights. The residuals from this equation reasonably approximate an individual's personal "bias"—i.e., the level of dissatisfaction that cannot be explained by one's feeling of autonomy.[5]

[5] We estimated results using a variety of different derivations of bias—for example, including income deciles, responses to questions on financial satisfaction, etc. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of these economic-condition variables. We feel that the satisfaction-agency/autonomy gap is a better proxy for bias than a life satisfaction-financial satisfaction gap (the correlation between life satisfaction and

Our basic specifications take the following form:

$$Q_{ict} = F\left(\hat{\beta}_y y_{ict}, \hat{\beta}_w \mathbf{w}_{ict}, \hat{\beta}_x \mathbf{x}_{ict}, \hat{\beta}_\theta \theta_i, \eta_t, \mu_c\right),$$

where Q is the political attitude or action of interest for individual i living in country c in year t, y is a measure of individual income, $\mathbf{w}$ is the set of individual "grievances" based on a rating of the policy-making effectiveness of the incumbent government, $\mathbf{x}$ is a vector of individual demographic characteristics, θ is the individual-specific systematic bias, η and μ are country- and time-fixed effects, respectively.

For the first of our dependent variables, the individual preference for revolution, we rely on the following WVS question:

> On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion: (1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action; (2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms; (3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.

We code this 1 if the respondent chooses the first answer, 0 otherwise. For the second dependent variable—individual support for violence—WVS asks:

> Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following statement: "Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified."

Responses range from 1 (agree strongly) to 4 (disagree strongly). We use the full range of responses in ordered logit regressions (rescaled so that the highest value represents maximum support for violence).[6] Finally, for the third outcome of interest we construct an index of political action based on responses to five different sub-questions asked as follows:

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financial satisfaction is over 0.60 in our sample). The derivation of bias also includes sampling weights (see below).

[6] We also use logit regressions as a robustness check, coding this variable 1 if the respondent chooses 4, 0 otherwise.

> I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it: (A) signing a petition; (B) joining in boycotts; (C) attending lawful demonstrations; (D) joining unofficial strikes; (E) occupying buildings or factories.

Two approaches to the construction of this variable are used. The methodology followed by some other researchers is simply to sum up the number of acts respondents said they have actually committed (Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002). Given that these actions differ in terms of the effort and risks involved, and to put extra weight on actions that signal stronger convictions, we construct a simple "political action index" as $A + 2\times B + 3\times C + 4\times D + 5\times E$, yielding a value that ranges between 0 and 15. Second, we construct a weighted index based on principal components analysis. In reality, both approaches yield similar results, and both are closely related to a simple sum of the five components.[7]

We use the WVS approximation of individual wealth, based on country-specific correspondence between reported income and income deciles. There are no questions in the WVS, unfortunately, that can measure individual or household wealth in other ways—for example, questions about consumption patterns, food,

[7] Analysis of the WVS has shown that the five components of political action form a single dimension. Previous factor analysis has shown that only one factor emerges with an eigenvalue greater than 1, and all five components are loaded strongly on that single factor (Dalton and van Sickle 2005). We combine the five components across four survey rounds into a single factor:

	Factor Loadings
Signed a petition	0.414
Joined a boycott	0.481
Lawful demonstration	0.479
Unofficial strikes	0.453
Occupying buildings	0.403
Eigenvalue	2.744
% Variance	0.549

shelter, access to services, etc., making it impossible to generate a "lived poverty" index as others have done (e.g., see Bratton 2006).

To construct indices of individual ratings of governmental policymaking effectiveness, we rely on two separate variables. First, we construct a "Change in political rating" score based on respondents' rating of the political system on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best). We subtract the rating of the system "as it was ten years before" from the current rating. Second, we use respondent answers on inequality of incomes as an economic performance rating—where individuals are asked to place their views on a scale of 1 (agreement with the statement "incomes should be made more equal") to 10 (agreement with the statement "we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort"). The perception of economic inequality, is the most comprehensive indicator of the perceptions regarding overall economic management.[8]

Among the demographic characteristics we include are: employment status, size of town in which the respondent lives, gender (male = 1), age, and education. In addition to country- and year-fixed effects, we include population-sampling weights in all estimations. Country-specific stratification methods, over- and under-representation of sub-samples, and non-response all require that sample weights be included in all estimations to derive unbiased population means and correct standard errors.[9]

[8] The WVS does include questions on "opportunities to escape from poverty," but these questions were included in very few survey rounds in developing countries. Other questions focus more explicitly on individual preferences for economic policy (e.g., whether the respondent believes in greater or lesser government intervention in the economy) than on systemic economic performance.

[9] Note that WVS response rates vary greatly. In addition, the WVS tended to over-sample upper-middle income groups in developing countries. To correct for the sample design and the response rate, sample weights were constructed with specific criteria for each country—essentially, the inverse of the probability that an individual is a member of the sample population (see, e.g., Inglehart et al. 2004).

Results

Ideology and Radicalism

We begin with an analysis of preferences for political change and ideology. Table 1 and table 2 present results from estimations of political ideology. Table 1 estimates radicalism, or the preference for revolution. WVS data on revolutionary "tastes," in other research, has been considered a useful proxy for instability (MacCulloch and Pezzini 2002). Alongside radicalism, we also estimate the opposite, namely, the view that society must be defended against "subversive" elements. Perceptions of worsening governmental performance, and of income inequality, increase the preference for revolt. Although income levels do not have a significant impact on radicalism, richer cohorts are more likely to be reactionary. Employment status and location have no effect. Interestingly, the more educated are also more likely to support radical solutions. Those who perceive the performance of the government improving, as expected, are less radical, while those who perceive widening income gaps are more disposed toward radicalism. We also compare, in this table, results from regressions for developing and high-income countries, and observe two sign shifts: better-educated individuals in richer countries are less likely to be radical (but are also less likely to be "reactionary"), and older individuals in richer countries are more likely to be reactionary.

Figure 1 plots the coefficients of the political-rating and inequality-perception covariates when restricting the sample to different income deciles. Analyses of Europe, the US, and Latin America have shown that the impacts of inequality on attitudes such as life satisfaction or happiness, for example, depend crucially on income levels (Alesina et al. 2004; Graham and Felton 2005). Decile regressions indicate that, aside from a sharp

increase in the correlation between inequality perceptions and radicalism among middle-income groups, the overall effect is essentially flat and barely above zero. By contrast, the negative effect of political ratings declines slightly across deciles, suggesting that a poorer view of governance is likely to push for more radicalism among richer individuals.

Table 2 uses a slightly different approach, examining how these factors influence self-positioning on a left-right scale. Wealthier individuals, those who perceive improvements in governmental effectiveness, and those who do not see greater inequality gravitate rightward. Reflecting the finding in table 1, education increases left-wing tendencies in both rich and poor countries. But in poor countries, the unemployed are more right-wing, unlike the case in richer countries. Moreover, in rich nations, those happy with the political performance of their country are more liberal. In addition, in developing nations it is the urban resident who is more conservative—again, the reverse of the situation in richer countries. Tables 1 and 2 (as well as tables 3 and 4 below) use both nonparametric bootstrap re-sampling and parametric clustering to derive coefficient errors. Equations with bootstrapped errors use 1,000 replications with fixed regressors. We also cluster errors at the sub-national level in the last columns in both tables. Overall the picture that emerges from developing nations is different than the conventional wisdom from richer countries, where the presumption is that urban-dwellers and the unemployed are the core constituencies of left-wing political movements. The situation is more complicated in poorer countries, possibly due to the strong ties of populist parties to rural areas and labor movements in these countries (see, e.g., Stokes 2001; Murillo 2000).

Support for Political Violence

Similar to our findings on radical tendencies above, in the ordered logit regressions in table 3 we see that the politically and economically alienated are more disposed towards the use of violence against the government in developing nations (alienation, while pushing individuals towards radicalism in high-income countries, seems to have no effect on individuals' support for violence in these countries). The unemployed and urban-dwellers—again—are natural groups to be mobilized into violence (and again, this does not appear to be the case in rich countries).

Income levels do not appear to have any significant effect among individuals in developing countries; in richer countries, wealthier individuals are less prone to support violence. Simple nonparametric analysis of this relationship, however, reveals a roughly quadratic, but overall positive, relationship between income and support for violence in developing countries. Figure 2 shows partial-residual plots of support for violence against income deciles, generated as follows. We estimate the full ordered-logit specification as in column (1) in table 3 to generate standard (non-bootstrapped) errors of the linear prediction. We then run local-polynomial regressions of these residuals on income deciles. The results quantify the isolated effect of income levels on support for violence. The effect increases through the bottom five income deciles and diminishes thereafter.

Table 4 segments the sample by income quintile, to allow a more careful examination of the conditional effect of income level on other covariates. Overall, the

effects are consistent across quintiles. We see, for example, that the dampening effect of a positive political rating on support for violence is relatively larger for the 4th quintile. For the lower and upper quintiles, the effect is of slightly lower magnitude. Economic inequities, on the other hand, have their greatest effect on increasing support for violence among the middle quintile.

Political Behavior

We examine, finally, the propensity to engage in (non-violent) political action in tables 5-6. Table 5 replicates our basic estimations with the two different political action indices. The results are generally consistent between the two outcome variables. We find strong support for the link between socioeconomic status and political engagement. Richer, better-educated, employed individuals in urban settings are more likely to partake in explicitly political acts. Those who are happy with the direction of governmental performance are more, not less, likely to participate in political actions. Those who are unhappy with economic inequities are less likely to do so (note that this is not the case in richer countries). In developing countries, it seems, the aggrieved stay out of everyday political life.

For a more complete look at the effects of the covariates on political action we rely on quantile regression—estimating a series of functions where percentiles of the conditional distribution of the political action index are expressed as functions of observed covariates. Quantile regression affords a more complete picture of the shape of the distribution of the outcome of interest (Koenker and Hallock 2001). We replicate the equation from column (1) in table 5. The results are shown in figure 3. Each graph plots

the estimates of different coefficients for percentiles ranging from 0.5 to 0.95. For figure 3, the dependent variable is the principal-component weighted political action score. For each covariate, these estimates may be interpreted as the estimated impact of a one-unit change in the covariate on political action, holding all other covariates fixed. The shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals for the quantile regression estimates. The solid lines show the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimate of the conditional mean effect, while the dotted lines represent the usual 95% confidence band for OLS estimates. Most of the covariate plots show greater dispersion of the effects among the highest percentiles—i.e., among the most politically active individuals.

Income decile has an increasing effect on political action in the lower end of the distribution, but becomes negative after the 75^{th} percentile. Poverty actually increases political activity among those in the higher end of the distribution. The effect of perceptions of governmental effectiveness increase then falls to zero towards the higher percentiles. Perceived economic inequities are a mirror-image to governmental performance, suggesting that economic injustices galvanize the already-mobilized even more. The effects of employment and urban location are positive but widely dispersed among the better-mobilized. Age reduces proclivities towards political activity, but the effect diminishes among the upper end of the distribution. Gender and education have consistent, increasing effects. Our quantile regression shows diminishing effects of most covariates on the upper percentiles of the politically active. For the more active, personal wealth and grievances matter less than for the less mobilized.

In table 6, finally, we decompose the political action index into its separate parts, enabling a more detailed view of the individual activities. We code each variable 0 if the

respondent claims to have never done these things, 1 if they "might" do it; and 2 if they have done it. Ordered logit regression results do reveal some differences across activities. Unlike earlier results, poorer individuals are more likely to demonstrate (but less likely to engage in other actions). Those who face economic inequities are more likely to join boycotts or demonstrations but less likely to sign petitions, participate in strikes or more extreme acts. All other covariates are consistent with earlier results.

Discussion

Radicalism in developing countries seems largely motivated by discontent with the political system and a lack of economic equity. Unlike the case in richer countries, wealth produced defenders of the status quo in developing nations. Similarly, poverty breeds leftism. From our examination of political action—both violent and non-violent—however, a different pattern emerges. The poor generally shy away from most political engagements. Violence for political ends does have its supporters among those who perceive malevolence on the part of their governments, or among those who complain about economic inequities. But "support" is not action. Controlling for other factors, the economically and politically marginalized, while susceptible to the appeals of radicalism, also avoid anti-governmental politics.

Political action against the state depends not only merely on preferences but also on perceived opportunities. What can be won? What are the chances of success? And what are the risks involved in the event of failure? The political lives of the marginalized depend not simply on perceived or actual grievances, but on the possession of resources needed to convert those demands into concrete action: income, education, and urban

residency seem to be critical factors in acquiring these resources. Acts of dissent and protest, ironically, appear to be the province of those who support the overall polity, its government, and its modes of economic management, rather than of citizens at the periphery. Indeed, this is consistent with the common bias towards more politically-engaged citizens found in matters of government spending and public service-delivery (Banerjee et al. 2007). Better-off citizens not only tend to engage more in ordinary political activities, they are also more likely to threaten its collapse.

Conclusions

Overall, we find evidence from survey data that economic and political discontent breeds radicalism and, at the same time, exclusion. Thus we have the vicious cycle of legitimation: alienation leads to self-exclusion, self-exclusion further marginalizes vulnerable groups from access to and representation in policymaking, disenfranchisement stacks the deck in favor of influential (better off) groups, which reinforces perceptions of inequality and political failure leading to even more radical political attitudes. It is thus the better-off who see the opportunities in political action to initiate change, even if it is the less well-off and marginalized citizens who have the strongest preferences for change.

How can these findings be squared with evidence that poorer communities (e.g., in India, and in some Latin American countries) are more politically active? One possibility is that political action in poor communities is oriented primarily towards the maintenance of patron-client ties. In communities where public service delivery is spotty, local brokers, *caudillos*, zamindars, etc., may provide certain services to local residents in return for securing support for particular parties. Indeed much of the

evidence from Latin America suggests that the poor are more active in political parties, rather than in protest participation. A second, related possibility is that poor communities are characterized by greater fragmentation or polarization than richer communities. Consequently, political action is directed in support of politicians more likely to provide goods to particular groups. There is evidence from India, for example, of politicians distributing public goods towards the social groups to which they belong (Banerjee and Pande 2007). In both cases, increased political activity at the community or village-level would not necessarily translate into a willingness to engage in anti-governmental dissent.

Understanding better the relationship between alienation and action requires a more complete picture of the effects household income and demographic factors, as well as the dynamics of group relations, on political behavior beyond voting—something that cannot, at the present, be done for more than a handful of developing countries given the data requirements. Complementing cross-country analyses to understand how economic conditions and different political preferences influence conflict is a potentially fruitful agenda for future data-collection and research.

Finally, of particular importance would be to identify the role of political institutions and economic policies for fostering inclusion. Common approaches are not without their pitfalls. Free and periodic multi-party elections give marginalized groups a potential voice, risk becoming captured by better-organized groups. Public policies in the form of public good provision, food subsidies, and cash transfers can also foster inclusion both directly (if groups observe that they can benefit from political participation) as well as indirectly by providing resources for education, but these types of programs require certain governmental capacities for effective targeting and for relatively high returns to

education. Decentralization of policy making, minority quotas, and community-based developmental interventions carry the potential to increase the incentives to limit self-exclusion, but these outcomes can be heterogeneous across different groups. These interactions between the poor, non-poor, and public officials as well as the calculations involved in the provision of policies aimed at fostering inclusion require further investigation and analysis. From our perspective a central obstacle to these approaches is not that program designers lack knowledge, managerial skill, or fiscal resources, but that politicians face strong incentives to use redistributive programs for partisan purposes, many of which require the continued political marginalization of the poor.

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Table 1: Preferences for Revolution, Logit Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Radical (1) – (3)			**Reactionary (4) – (6)**		
	Dev Countries	*High Income Countries*	*Clustered Errors*	*Dev Countries*	*High Income Countries*	*Clustered Errors*
Income decile	-0.0150	-0.0615**	-0.0162	0.0470***	-0.0120	0.0488
	(0.0108)	(0.0275)	(0.0175)	(0.0092)	(0.0151)	(0.0693)
Change in political rating	-0.0710***	-0.0360	-0.0707***	0.0037	-0.0588***	0.0031
	(0.0077)	(0.0265)	(0.0157)	(0.0067)	(0.0153)	(0.0131)
Inequality perception	0.0678***	0.0477	0.0669***	-0.0291***	-0.0648***	-0.0289
	(0.0077)	(0.0291)	(0.0178)	(0.0070)	(0.0153)	(0.0339)
Unemployed	-0.0710	0.7775***	-0.0744	-0.0057	0.0835	-0.0014
	(0.0817)	(0.2297)	(0.0895)	(0.0731)	(0.2076)	(0.1023)
Location	0.0088	-0.0305	0.0098	0.0169*	0.0202	0.0167
	(0.0104)	(0.0307)	(0.0142)	(0.0099)	(0.0169)	(0.0187)
Gender	0.3383***	0.0413	0.3458***	-0.0680	0.0583	-0.0659
	(0.0485)	(0.1296)	(0.0769)	(0.0418)	(0.0751)	(0.0525)
Age	-0.0135***	-0.0315***	-0.0133***	-0.0223***	0.0150***	-0.0224*
	(0.0017)	(0.0045)	(0.0034)	(0.0016)	(0.0024)	(0.0131)
Education	0.0468***	-0.0614*	0.0470**	0.0093	-0.1782***	0.0083
	(0.0119)	(0.0361)	(0.0205)	(0.0101)	(0.0202)	(0.0522)
Bias	-0.0257**	-0.0249	-0.0264	0.0140	0.0133	0.0139
	(0.0116)	(0.0381)	(0.0180)	(0.0104)	(0.0229)	(0.0154)
N	40,939	8,616	40,772	40,939	8,616	40,772
R^2	0.3514	0.0835	0.3528	0.2752	0.1043	0.2767

Notes: All estimations include intercepts, country and time dummies (not reported), and are weighted by population-sample weights. Standard errors are based on bootstrap re-sampling of 1,000 replications. Errors in (6) are clustered by region.

*** $p < 0.01$
** $p < 0.05$
* $p < 0.10$

Figure 1: Determinants of Radicalism, Decile Regressions



Table 2: Left-Right Ideology, Logit Regressions

	(1) *Developing Countries*	(2) *High Income Countries*	(3) *Clustered Errors*
Income decile	0.0373***	0.0227***	0.0384***
	(0.0073)	(0.0088)	(0.0143)
Change in political rating	0.0795***	-0.0972***	0.0801***
	(0.0055)	(0.0100)	(0.0295)
Inequality perception	-0.1208***	-0.1382***	-0.1224*
	(0.0059)	(0.0093)	(0.0672)
Unemployed	0.1713***	-0.3367***	0.1744**
	(0.0606)	(0.1017)	(0.0854)
Location	0.0147**	-0.0394***	0.0152
	(0.0074)	(0.0099)	(0.0353)
Gender	0.2238***	0.1066**	0.2270***
	(0.0330)	(0.0432)	(0.0537)
Age	-0.0011	0.0100***	-0.0008
	(0.0011)	(0.0014)	(0.0067)
Education	-0.0845***	-0.0432***	-0.0857*
	(0.0083)	(0.0111)	(0.0485)
Bias	0.1146***	0.0519***	0.1152***
	(0.0090)	(0.0141)	(0.0261)
N	36,777	11,875	36,523
R^2	0.4540	0.1240	0.4561

Notes: All estimations include intercepts, country and time dummies (not reported), and are weighted by population-sample weights. Standard errors are based on bootstrap re-sampling of 1,000 replications. Errors in (3) are clustered by region.

*** $p < 0.01$
** $p < 0.05$
* $p < 0.10$

Table 3: Violence, Ordered Logit Regressions

	(1) *Developing Countries*	(2) *High-Income Countries*	(3) *Clustered Errors*
Income decile	-0.0048	-0.0199*	-0.0048
	(0.0057)	(0.0111)	(0.0109)
Change in political rating	-0.0153***	0.0095	-0.0153***
	(0.0041)	(0.0109)	(0.0035)
Inequality perception	0.0128***	-0.0066	0.0128**
	(0.0048)	(0.0109)	(0.0052)
Unemployed	0.0897**	0.0760	0.0897*
	(0.0426)	(0.1367)	(0.0478)
Location	0.0125**	-0.0016	0.0125**
	(0.0056)	(0.0128)	(0.0058)
Gender	0.1224***	0.1514***	0.1224***
	(0.0261)	(0.0548)	(0.0339)
Age	-0.0038***	-0.0067***	-0.0038***
	(0.0009)	(0.0017)	(0.0010)
Education	-0.0269***	-0.0825***	-0.0269***
	(0.0069)	(0.0141)	(0.0091)
Bias	0.0095	-0.0054	0.0095
	(0.0061)	(0.0168)	(0.0089)
N	23,056	6,610	23,056
R^2	0.0144	0.0313	0.0144

Notes: All estimations include intercepts, country and time dummies (not reported), and are weighted by population-sample weights. Standard errors are based on bootstrap re-sampling of 1,000 replications. Errors in (3) are clustered by region.

*** $p < 0.01$
** $p < 0.05$
* $p < 0.10$

Figure 2: Support for Violence by Income Decile, Local-Polynomial Regression



Note: Graph shows isolated effect of income decile on individual support for political violence, developing countries only, based on local-polynomial regression with biweight (quartic) kernels and bandwidths of 2.0. The shaded band represents 95% confidence.

Table 4: Violence and Political Action, Income-Quintile Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Violence is Justified (1) – (5)				
Quintile:	*1st*	*2nd*	*3rd*	*4th*	*5th*
Change in political rating	-0.0657***	-0.0453***	-0.0663***	-0.0722***	-0.0488**
	(0.0142)	(0.0150)	(0.0158)	(0.0178)	(0.0233)
Inequality perception	0.0444***	0.0453***	0.0729***	0.0176	0.0579**
	(0.0162)	(0.0159)	(0.0179)	(0.0204)	(0.0284)
Unemployed	0.1118	0.0649	-0.2989	-0.3136	-0.6238
	(0.1186)	(0.1484)	(0.1890)	(0.2599)	(0.4264)
Location	-0.0141	-0.0009	0.0226	0.0280	0.0008
	(0.0187)	(0.0213)	(0.0222)	(0.0255)	(0.0368)
Gender	0.2343***	0.2190**	0.1406	0.3869***	0.5798***
	(0.0896)	(0.0972)	(0.1033)	(0.1100)	(0.1546)
Age	-0.0140***	-0.0191***	-0.0115***	-0.0109**	-0.0090
	(0.0034)	(0.0038)	(0.0039)	(0.0044)	(0.0056)
Education	0.0227	0.0713***	0.0372	0.0050	0.0196
	(0.0241)	(0.0262)	(0.0262)	(0.0291)	(0.0409)
Bias	0.0018	-0.0586***	-0.0006	-0.0789***	-0.1066***
	(0.0194)	(0.0213)	(0.0242)	(0.0294)	(0.0391)
N	8,589	12,763	8,569	6,901	2,330
R^2	0.7777	0.1576	0.5860	0.2604	0.0993

Notes: All estimations include intercepts, country and time dummies (not reported), and are weighted by population-sample weights. Standard errors are based on bootstrap re-sampling of 1,000 replications.
*** $p < 0.01$
** $p < 0.05$
* $p < 0.10$

Table 5: Propensity to Engage in Political Action

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Political Action Index (principal components)			**Political Action Index (5-component sum)**		
	Dev Countries	*High Income Countries*	*Clustered Errors*	*Dev Countries*	*High Income Countries*	*Clustered Errors*
Income decile	0.0179***	0.0498***	0.0183**	0.0532***	0.0549	0.1559***
	(0.0048)	(0.0079)	(0.0084)	(0.0188)	(0.0389)	(0.0586)
Change in political rating	0.0278***	0.0266***	0.0274***	0.1246***	0.1228**	0.1062**
	(0.0032)	(0.0079)	(0.0099)	(0.0119)	(0.0492)	(0.0439)
Inequality perception	-0.0182***	0.0607***	-0.0183	-0.0820***	-0.0831	0.3174***
	(0.0033)	(0.0078)	(0.0226)	(0.0129)	(0.1032)	(0.0740)
Unemployed	-0.0984**	-0.0143	-0.0903**	-0.3525**	-0.3201**	-0.0434
	(0.0384)	(0.1078)	(0.0446)	(0.1431)	(0.1626)	(0.4278)
Location	0.0238***	0.0765***	0.0251	0.1257***	0.1303*	0.3343***
	(0.0048)	(0.0092)	(0.0158)	(0.0181)	(0.0745)	(0.0830)
Gender	0.4946***	0.2424***	0.4963***	2.0557***	2.0574***	1.1597***
	(0.0214)	(0.0392)	(0.0268)	(0.0820)	(0.1219)	(0.2480)
Age	-0.0104***	-0.0212***	-0.0103***	-0.0387***	-0.0380***	-0.0799***
	(0.0007)	(0.0011)	(0.0025)	(0.0027)	(0.0084)	(0.0063)
Education	0.0924***	0.1805***	0.0935***	0.2525***	0.2542**	0.6874***
	(0.0053)	(0.0103)	(0.0145)	(0.0208)	(0.1037)	(0.0604)
Bias	-0.0241***	0.0210*	-0.0239**	-0.0669***	-0.0659	0.2530**
	(0.0050)	(0.0112)	(0.0097)	(0.0193)	(0.0422)	(0.1234)
N	35,595	13,592	35,332	44,655	44,366	13,054
R2	0.3450	0.4179	0.3462	0.3080	0.3091	0.4430

Notes: All estimations include intercepts, country and time dummies (not reported), and are weighted by population-sample weights. Standard errors are based on bootstrap re-sampling of 1,000 replications. Errors in (3) and in (6) are clustered by region.

*** $p < 0.01$
** $p < 0.05$
* $p < 0.10$

Figure 3: Determinants of Political Action, Quantile Regressions



Notes: Graphs show coefficients for covariates in regression from table 5, column (1) by sample percentiles based on a quantile regression with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Table 6: Types of Political Action, Ordered Logit Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Petition	*Boycott*	*Demonstrate*	*Strike*	*Occupy*
Income decile	0.0349***	0.0024	-0.0175**	-0.0060	0.0429***
	(0.0069)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0081)	(0.0097)
Change in political rating	0.0439***	0.0384***	0.0368***	0.0411***	0.0241***
	(0.0046)	(0.0049)	(0.0047)	(0.0055)	(0.0069)
Inequality perception	-0.0476***	0.0304***	0.0216***	-0.0500***	-0.0276***
	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0049)	(0.0057)	(0.0069)
Unemployed	-0.3782***	-0.0745	-0.0517	-0.1329**	-0.0014
	(0.0522)	(0.0580)	(0.0514)	(0.0651)	(0.0769)
Location	0.0242***	0.0143**	0.0155**	0.0667***	-0.0046
	(0.0064)	(0.0070)	(0.0068)	(0.0080)	(0.0099)
Gender	0.5052***	0.6902***	0.5142***	0.7122***	0.7025***
	(0.0298)	(0.0321)	(0.0314)	(0.0365)	(0.0454)
Age	-0.0069***	-0.0087***	-0.0111***	-0.0245***	-0.0367***
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0010)	(0.0012)	(0.0016)
Education	0.1643***	0.1293***	0.1653***	0.0191**	0.0986***
	(0.0075)	(0.0078)	(0.0079)	(0.0090)	(0.0111)
Bias	0.0027	-0.0621***	-0.0093	-0.0364***	-0.0582***
	(0.0071)	(0.0079)	(0.0075)	(0.0090)	(0.0108)
N	41,384	39,575	40,002	41,104	37,989
R^2	0.2545	0.2303	0.1547	0.2334	0.2037

Notes: All estimations include intercepts, country and time dummies (not reported), and are weighted by population-sample weights. Standard errors are based on bootstrap re-sampling of 1,000 replications.
*** $p < 0.01$
** $p < 0.05$
* $p < 0.10$