SITE Seminar | Credible threats
Working paper: Credible Threats
By: Martin Dufwenberg, Flora Li, and Alec Smith
Abstract
We study the effect of communication on deterrence and costly punishment. We show that a theoretical model of belief-dependent anger captures the relationship between messages, beliefs, and behavior and implies that threats can generate credible commitments. We test our model in a between-subjects experiment with belief elicitation where one-sided communication is available as a treatment. The evidence supports the theory, demonstrating that communicated threats change beliefs and payoff expectations and lead to greater rates of costly punishment. Threats successfully deter co-players from exploiting the strategic environment to their advantage.
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